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PREFACE 
 
Since its inception, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Fiscal Affairs 
Department (FAD) has supported technical assistance (TA) in the area of public expenditure 
management (PEM) in sub-Saharan Africa. This report summarizes FAD’s internal 
evaluation of TA in this area, delivered to a sample of 10, mostly Anglophone-heritage 
African countries that have been major recipients.
1 The evaluation formed part of the 
Fund-wide Technical Assistance Evaluation Program that was launched in FY2003. 
 
The study is based on standardized reviews of FAD’s TA to each of these countries—
conducted mainly in 2003—which focused on the principal PEM issues addressed 
by FAD TA, the problems encountered, successes and failures of the TA, and the main 
factors that had an impact on the effectiveness of this TA, both positively and negatively. 
This report highlights the principal findings and the lessons to be learned from the reviews 
and suggests how these might affect future FAD TA delivery to such countries. 
 
In the sections that follow, Section I reviews the typical problems affecting PEM systems in 
the selected countries. Section II briefly describes the TA inputs delivered by FAD in the 
recent past and country experiences in regard to the outputs achieved. This section also 
discusses the revealed prioritization of FAD’s TA and the mode of delivery. Section III 
evaluates the impact of FAD TA on its main areas of focus—namely, expenditure and 
commitment control, fiscal reporting, accounting systems, and integrated financial 
management information systems (IFMIS), as well as budget preparation issues, including 
support for medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs). This section also considers 
other relevant areas in PEM that were not substantially addressed by FAD but might be 
considered priorities in the future. Section IV reviews the delivery of TA in PEM and 
suggests a number of improvements to the planning and management of TA that would 
further enhance its effectiveness. Finally, Section V summarizes the lessons learned from this 
evaluation for FAD’s future TA, and offers a possible reformulated strategy that will be more 
effective in terms both of its focus and mode of delivery.  
 
The authors would like to acknowledge the important contribution to this study by all of their 
colleagues in the two PEM divisions, and most especially that of Jim Brumby and 
Ian Lienert, who acted as the team’s principal internal referees, as well as Arik De, who 
provided invaluable research assistance, and Professor Clive Gray, who acted as the group’s 
external peer reviewer.
2 We are also grateful to Carla Cullati, Joyce Nyairo, Vanessa Abrea, 
Miriam Villarroel, Raquel Malamud, and Victoria Macchi, who, between other heavy 
demands on their time, so cheerfully worked on many versions of this report.  
                                                 
1 Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The sample of 10 
countries also includes Rwanda, which is a member of “ La francophone.” While acknowledging the 
considerable diversity among the PEM systems of countries in this study, the term “Anglophone” is used 
loosely as a generic term to differentiate the PEM systems of the countries being studied from those with a 
“Francophone” or alternative heritage.  
2 Professor Gray is a retired  Fellow of the Harvard Institute for International Development and Senior Fellow in 
Development at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. - 7 - 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
 
In the International Monetary Fund, the Fiscal Affairs Department’s (FAD’s) technical 
assistance in the area of public expenditure management (PEM) in Africa addresses one 
source of fiscal imbalance that jeopardizes macroeconomic stability in many of these 
countries. This report summarizes FAD’s internal evaluation of its technical assistance (TA) 
in this area, delivered to a sample of 10 mostly Anglophone African countries.
3 The 
evaluation benefited from the advice and comments of an external peer reviewer, 
Professor Clive Gray.
4  
 
The study is based on standardized reviews of FAD’s TA to each of these countries. The 
reviews focused on the principal PEM issues addressed by the TA, the problems 
encountered, successes and failures of the TA, and the main factors that had an impact on the 
effectiveness of this TA, both positively and negatively. This summary distills the principal 
findings and the lessons to be learned from the full report, and describes proposals for a 
reformulated strategy for TA delivery to this group of countries. 
 
A significant share of the TA provided by FAD in the PEM area has been directed to the 
countries covered by this evaluation (measured in terms of the field time of staff and experts 
in person-years
5). Between FY1998 and FY2003, this TA consumed an average of 54 percent 
of all Fund TA in PEM to the Africa region as a whole. This region has also been the largest 
single consumer of Fund TA in PEM, consuming an average of 35 percent of the total TA in 
PEM provided by FAD during the period. The share of Fund TA in PEM provided to Africa 
has also increased in recent years, averaging over 40 percent of total Fund TA in PEM in 
FY2002 and FY2003 (this is partly due to the decline in the amount received by the transition 
countries in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet 
Union).  
 
There are also some distinctive features in the mix of TA inputs to this group of countries. 
During the period, there has been a trend to rely more on resident advisors than on missions 
in the delivery of TA and this, in turn, was reflected in a sharp increase in the amount of TA 
delivered during the period, as measured in person-years. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
4 Professor Gray is a retired Fellow of the Harvard Institute for International Development and Senior Fellow in 
Development at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
5 This measure ignores the considerable resources devoted to TA outside of the field, including activities such 
as mission preparation and the backstopping of resident advisors. - 8 - 
 
Diagnosis of PEM problems  
 
Most of the countries examined were colonies of the United Kingdom, inheriting very similar 
and relatively simple budget systems based on an interpretation of the “Westminster model” 
around the time of independence. This generally involved budget laws that were not specific 
in their requirements regarding budget preparation, execution, and reporting processes, 
leaving much of this detail to regulations drafted and enforced by the executive branch.
6 The 
Westminster model also involved substantial devolution of authority for budget management 
to spending units. While all of the more advanced countries applying the Westminster model 
have initiated major reforms in their budgetary frameworks during the intervening period, 
this has not occurred to the same extent in developing countries. 
 
To establish the context within which PEM TA has been designed and delivered, Box 1 
summarizes the main shortcomings in the process of budget formulation and execution, as 
well as the main governance and institutional impediments to improving PEM systems in the 
countries studied. The shortcomings are not ordered in terms of priority, and there is no 
suggestion that all shortcomings were equally in evidence in all countries. Many are 
interrelated, and it should be recognized that governance and institutional issues have 
implications beyond the realm of PEM. 
 
The country studies suggest that inadequate control and management of public expenditure 
have often stemmed from two major weaknesses in governance. First, in the name of 
promoting development, governments—in part with the encouragement of donors—have 
often assumed functions and tasks beyond their capacity to execute. The problem has 
worsened as governments have lost qualified staff through declining real compensation and 
the ravages of HIV/AIDS. Second, political systems have failed to restrain politicians and 
senior bureaucrats from benefiting personally from lax fiscal controls; hence, fiscal 
indiscipline has been a common difficulty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This placed the executive branch in a very strong position vis-à-vis parliament, with parliament providing the 
executive branch the legal basis to make the regulations. Parliament had little power to change budgets, and few 
resources and little information to review budgetary performance.  - 9 - 
 
Box 1. Typical Problems Affecting PEM 
The process of budget formulation  
•  Annual budgeting is incremental, with no forward medium-term framework; 
•  Budgets are based on unrealistic revenue and expenditure projections; 
•  Dual budget systems de-link recurrent and capital and development spending; 
•  Detailed line item budgeting is the norm, emphasizing inputs without much regard for functions or 
programs; 
•  The coverage of the budget is often seriously incomplete; and 
•  The budget timetable is typically compressed, allowing little time for parliamentary discussion. 
 
The process of budget execution 
•  Expenditure control is weak, with associated accumulation of arrears; 
•  Decentralized PEM systems, where spending ministries often have a large amount of delegated authority 
over the expenditure process, may complicate modernization efforts associated with computerization or 
management reforms, compared with more centralized systems; 
•  Internal control systems and internal audit are often ineffective and compliance is weak; 
•  The accounting framework, usually cash-based, does not provide useful management information, such as 
tracking commitments; 
•  Dispersed government banking arrangements, in the absence of a single treasury account, hinder effective 
cash management; and 
•  The external audit is often poorly resourced and lacks trained staff; enforcement is not supported by 
technical and political institutional arrangements. 
 
Governance and institutional impediments to improving PEM 
•  There is a lack of commitment and accountability by high-level authorities, coupled at times with high 
levels of corruption; 
•  The ministry of finance is unable to enforce fiscal discipline over spending units, which are often 
protected through political patronage; 
•  There is an institutional fragmentation in the finance functions, with poor coordination between budget 
preparation and budget execution functions; and 
•  There is a weak legal framework, which presupposes a strong-willed executive branch to enforce good 
practices through regulations. 
 
Overview of FAD’s TA 
 
Country reviews suggest that PEM problems are widespread and that there are few areas in 
the PEM systems of the countries covered that do not require strengthening in some way. Of 
course, this observation holds not only for the countries covered in the evaluation but applies 
generally to all developing countries. For the most part, FAD’s TA was preceded by missions 
that reviewed the entire PEM system. As a TA provider with limited resources, FAD has had 
to prioritize and concentrate on some areas more than others. However, in doing so, FAD’s 
TA has been exposed to two main risks. First, by concentrating on only one part (or even a 
few parts) of a larger interrelated system, its efforts in one area may have been undermined 
by weaknesses in others. Second, the prioritized approach may have been too narrow, not 
taking account of the wider picture. This underlying dilemma emerges throughout this study 
and may not be entirely resolvable. 
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The provision of TA in PEM by FAD was concentrated on budget execution issues and was 
closely linked with financial programs agreed upon with the IMF. Budget preparation and 
other issues were often left to other providers. PEM issues were incorporated in the design of 
Fund programs in a variety of ways, as a combination of prior actions, structural performance 
criteria, and structural benchmarks. In addition, while not all Fund-supported programs 
contained conditionality relating to PEM reforms, programs routinely highlighted 
weaknesses in fiscal management, reporting, and related statistical issues that have had 
important implications for TA. This emphasis on programs could have helped to harness 
additional support from other providers and authorities in these areas or they may have been 
viewed as moral suasion to support broader PEM reforms. Letters of intent agreed upon with 
governments have also often included commitments by governments to improve national 
statistics in line with the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS), which incorporates 
the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) as an underpinning to good fiscal reporting. 
 
In sum, FAD’s TA has focused, in order of priority, on budget execution, budget preparation, 
and promoting compliance with budget regulations. Under the general heading of budget 
execution, the focus has been on improving expenditure control and fiscal reporting. A major 
focus has been on supplementing cash controls with commitment controls in order to bring 
expenditures in line with cash availability, and in this way prevent subsequent expenditure 
control problems, such as payment arrears. These areas are also emphasized in many country 
programs and point to the fact that FAD’s technical assistance for PEM in this group of 
countries has often performed a support function for Fund programs. 
 
Within the area of budget preparation, TA focused on the following issues (in order of 
priority): enhancing budget classifications; improving the realism of budget projections; 
ending dual budgeting by consolidating recurrent and development budgets; extending 
budget coverage; supporting the development of a medium-term expenditure frame-
work (MTEF); and reviewing budget procedures, particularly by introducing more realistic 
budget calendars. TA to promote compliance with budget regulations was often undertaken 
in partnership with the World Bank and other bilateral donors. The other institutions focused 
on strengthening financial regulations, drafting new laws and regulations, enhancing public 
procurement, and developing internal and external audit, which were activities not 
substantially addressed by FAD’s TA. The decentralization policies that have emerged in the 
majority of these countries, and the associated need to revise laws and budget processes, 
were also largely supported by assistance from other donors. A related area of advice was 
improving cash management, concurrently with reforming government banking 
arrangements and consolidating cash in a treasury single account (TSA).  
 
The need for more accurate and timely fiscal reporting led to a major effort to improve 
accounting systems, the source of basic fiscal data. Often, this was associated with support 
for longer-term projects, such as IFMISs, financed by other donors. In some cases, FAD TA 
was explicitly used to fill a temporary gap in this area while other donors worked on larger 
and more comprehensive IFMIS programs (which often took substantially longer than 
envisaged). In response to the enhanced heavily indebted poor country (HIPC) debt relief 
initiative, FAD has also advised on the development of systems to report on poverty reducing - 11 - 
 
expenditures in the relevant countries (eight in this group). The consequent establishment and 
strengthening of reporting systems on pro-poor spending also became a major task for 
resident advisors toward the end of the sample period. 
 
Performance of PEM systems in Selected African Countries 
The joint examination by the World Bank and Fund of the quality of PEM systems in the 
context of the enhanced HIPC initiative provides a dataset to compare the performance of the 
Anglophone HIPCs with other HIPCs.
7 This shows that PEM systems in Anglophone Africa 
have many of the same weaknesses as systems in other HIPCs. While Anglophone systems 
performed slightly better than other systems in budget reporting—mainly due to more timely 
final accounts closure and better in-year reporting—they performed considerably less well in 
budget preparation and slightly less well in execution. The best performing PEM system of 
any HIPC was in an Anglophone country (Uganda), as was the worst (Ghana).
8  
 
Data on completed actions to improve PEM systems, also part of the HIPC PEM assessment 
and action plan exercise, show that Anglophone African HIPCs are implementing actions at 
about the same pace as other HIPCs. In the first review of the action plans, the eight 
Anglophone African HIPCs covered in this evaluation were shown to have either fully 
implemented or initiated about 78 percent of the 116 actions they had specified.
9 This 
compared to a rate of 79 percent in other HIPCs. However, the Anglophone countries had 
completed fewer of the actions, at 16 percent, than had the rest of the HIPCs, at 24 percent.  
 
Quality of technical assistance provided 
The evaluation reviewed priority subject areas in which FAD had provided TA over the 
period. The main areas covered were expenditure and commitment control, fiscal reporting, 
accounting systems and IFMISs, and budget preparation and the MTEF. By its nature, the 
evaluation focused on areas of potential improvement. FAD experts retain sound reputations 
for the quality of their advice. This advice benefits from the “backstopping” of all experts by 
headquarters-based staff, who review the advice being provided by the experts.  
 
                                                 
7 IMF, 2002, Actions to Strengthen the Tracking of Poverty-Reducing Public Spending. Available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2002/track/032202.htm. 
8 Uganda met 9 of the 15 performance benchmarks, while Ghana met 1. Overall, the mean number of 
benchmarks met was slightly lower in Anglophone African (5.875) than for the entire set of HIPCs (6). A 
comprehensive reassessment of HIPC PEM systems was undertaken during 2003 and 2004. The results of this 
reassessment were reported to the Bank and Fund Boards in early 2005. 
9 IMF, 2003, Update on Implementation of Action Plans to Strengthen Capacity of HIPCs to Track Poverty-
Reducing Public Spending. Available at www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2003/track/030703.htm. - 12 - 
 
A theme that emerged was that FAD’s procedure for responding to immediate problems in 
the short-term, without an overall game plan for the country, may not always have been the 
best approach. Furthermore, too often FAD recommendations were transmitted but lacked 
adequate follow-up. In some cases, FAD had no reliable information about what had 
occurred in the country as a result of a TA report. As one would expect, the evaluators found 
the performance of advisors to be uneven. Advisors with developing country experience and 
strong interpersonal skills tended to fare better than advisors who had strong technical 
qualifications, but were less well-rounded. 
 
Specific findings were made about improving TA in each of the four priority areas: 
 
•  On commitment controls, FAD advice had remained too focused on technical 
problems rather than dealing with chronic root causes of payment arrears. Unless 
these root causes associated with unrealistic budget preparation and ineffective cash 
planning were addressed, technical advice about compiling and controlling 
commitments was not likely to be successful. 
•  In fiscal reporting, two separate needs had to be addressed. The first was to ensure 
that basic information was available to assist fiscal monitoring, including of payment 
arrears, in the context of Fund programs. This would include the application of some 
benchmarked procedures to ensure a minimum level of data quality. The second was 
the longer-term need to bolster the standing of the accounting function within 
government and to build accounting capacity.  
•  In supporting computerization of the accounting system, certain preconditions are 
required for there to be any chance of success, and an exit point should be agreed 
upon with the authorities to prevent continued external technical advice from 
crowding out the creation of local capacity.  
•  FAD was least well-placed to make a useful contribution on MTEFs, which depend 
on sectoral specialist expertise. Accordingly, it was better to refocus on aspects of 
core technical budget preparation, such as budget classifications systems, macro-
fiscal analysis, integrating capital and current budgets, and improving forecasting 
abilities.  
 
FAD’s mode of TA delivery 
Typically, TA delivery has consisted of infrequent missions and one resident advisor in a 
central agency. In a budget system where the responsibility for delivering on reforms is 
largely at the spending ministry (SM) level, it is perhaps not surprising that the limited TA 
that was provided proved insufficient to address significant system-wide capacity constraints. 
However, these underlying challenges only reinforce the need for TA to be well-focused to 
be effective. Sometimes, in the face of widespread problems, an advisor’s terms of 
reference (TOR) were deliberately wide-ranging, which created tendencies for the TA to be - 13 - 
 
spread rather thinly, and for the advisor to be drawn into keeping inadequate systems running 
rather than reforming them. Furthermore, given the extent of the capacity constraints, in 
hindsight, FAD often had unrealistic expectations of the time frame for undertaking reforms. 
Even in those cases where progress was made, it was generally much slower than expected.  
 
At first glance, the heavy reliance on resident advisors seems at odds with FAD’s desire to 
remain at the diagnostic or strategic end of TA, ideally laying out a TA plan, but with 
implementation being largely the responsibility of other providers with greater resources. The 
latter approach would have implied, perhaps, shorter-term TA interventions. However, this 
option was not applicable to many of the countries under review. First, many of FAD’s TA 
interventions were in support of Fund programs, on issues that other providers could not be 
expected to consider as important as FAD did, partly because of the link to Fund-supported 
programs. Second, in Anglophone Africa, other providers of TA in the PEM area often 
already had well-formulated agendas and more resources, so there was little reason for them 
to recognize FAD as a lead agency or to follow its strategic assessments. Third, given the low 
administrative capacity in many countries, it was felt that successful implementation of 
FAD’s recommendations required hands-on support from resident advisors, missions, or 
peripatetic advisors, in order for basic work to be done. 
 
The Overall impact of TA  
A review of the impact of Fund TA in the PEM area in mainly Anglophone Africa reveals a 
distinctly mixed picture. There are some clear successes but also distinct failures. In some 
cases, there have been some disappointing reversals. On the other hand, there have been 
some cases where sets of improvements have been put in place after some years of decline. 
In reviewing country case studies, it is apparent that the wider political and economic 
environment is a critical factor influencing PEM reforms. Quite simply, good advice is not 
always acted on. It is worth underscoring that in many ways, and perhaps not surprisingly, 
FAD’s experience mirrors the mixed success of Fund programs in these countries. For the 
10 countries covered, the overall evaluations were as follows: 
•  Two countries had encouraging or very encouraging results. 
•  Two countries had mixed results.  
•  Four countries had small or limited results.  
•  One country had disappointing results. 
•  One country had extremely disappointing results.  - 14 - 
 
Influences on the effectiveness of TA 
The country cases provide evidence of some generic problems that could be addressed, in 
some manner, by all those involved in PEM TA, in order to improve its effectiveness. These 
problems can be grouped into four broad categories: (i) an apparent lack of commitment by 
the authorities to implement PEM reforms; (ii) a lack of local administrative and technical 
capacity to carry through with reforms; (iii) the reactive, demand-led orientation of Fund TA; 
and (iv) as discussed briefly above, possibly an excessive dependence on resident advisors 
with prolonged stays (over two years) as the mode of TA delivery. 
 
Apparent lack of commitment by the authorities 
In many cases, the country reviews attribute the failure to sustain PEM reforms to the 
inability of the authorities—and particularly the ministry of finance—to enforce genuine 
changes in systems and practices even where the technical and administrative capability was 
judged to exist. This, in turn, throws into doubt the local ownership of the reforms and, in 
some cases, the commitment to fiscal discipline at the highest level.  
 
The constraint imposed by a lack of local ownership was particularly relevant given that 
FAD’s TA was often of a fire-fighting nature. Although FAD’s TA recommendations 
included measures for longer-term development of the PEM systems, often the primary focus 
was on putting in place immediate measures to relieve urgent problems, typically within the 
context of a Fund program. Sequencing and prioritization were largely imposed on FAD’s 
TA by the context, usually one of fiscal stress, rather than being decided strategically as part 
of an optimally designed reform of the PEM process. Certainly, in most countries, if FAD’s 
short-term agenda were to have been achieved, the medium-term impact would have been 
high, but, equally, to sustain the reforms required a firm commitment on the part of the 
government and, in some cases, continued cooperation between the national authorities and 
all TA providers. Unfortunately, the latter features were difficult to achieve, and often 
complementary programs were seriously delayed or not implemented.  
 
Lack of local capacity 
In part, difficulties in sustaining reforms in PEM systems were exacerbated by weaknesses in 
administrative capacity and technical skills. This, in turn, partly reflected an inability of 
host country institutions to attract and retain high-quality staff with remuneration packages 
sufficient to ensure competitive terms for competent local staff. While comprehensive civil 
service reform may have been the ideal solution, such programs were clearly outside the 
scope of FAD’s remit, although this is one area in which other donors were actively engaged 
(though again with mixed success). 
 
Ensuring adequate counterpart capacity to make FAD’s TA effective is recognized as one of 
the most important constraints and therefore a challenge for the TA program. However, there 
is no quick fix to the problem. Methods that circumvent nominal civil service remuneration - 15 - 
 
scales to attract and retain staff—either through various supplements or direct donor 
supplementation of local salaries—may soon become generalized or create small islands of 
excellence that function for a limited period but may dissipate if donor support is withdrawn. 
Also, there may not be sufficient local expertise with particular skills within the country to 
satisfy the immediate demand. It must also be remembered that an increasingly important 
external constraint on administrative capacity in many countries has been the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic.
10 
 
Demand-determined orientation of FAD TA  
Over the period examined, FAD’s approach to supplying TA has been largely demand 
driven, with assistance provided in response to requests from the authorities, albeit that many 
of these requests are actively supported by the Fund area department. This has led to the 
criticism that FAD’s TA tended to more of a short-term response to particular urgent needs, 
rather than an attack on longer-term—and perhaps more fundamental—problems. However, 
overall, FAD’s degree of freedom to be more proactive has not been great, and there are 
many good reasons for the practice of supplying TA only in response to an official request. 
In addition, while there is a potential for tension between short-term, often partial, solutions 
and more comprehensive longer-term solutions, it is often the case that longer-term solutions 
cannot be introduced unless immediate problems are addressed first.  
 
However, it can be argued with some plausibility that if FAD had been more involved over 
the longer term, it might have been possible to identify and address problems as they arose 
and before they reached crisis proportions. However, not only would such an approach have 
required more of FAD’s limited resources, owing to the large demand for TA services from a 
wider constituency, it also assumes a sustained level of national commitment to ongoing 
PEM reform. It is unclear whether other providers have had more sustained success with TA 
in PEM, even with more long-term and comprehensive programs of support. 
 
A reformulated TA strategy: learning lessons from past experience 
The difficulties faced in introducing different PEM reforms suggests that FAD’s future 
TA strategy should be more strategically oriented and better coordinated with the 
medium-term capacity-building efforts of other providers. There is some scope for 
selectively getting involved in new areas, although this scope is quite limited because of 
resource constraints. 
                                                 
10 Of the sample countries covered in this paper, Zambia has the highest adult infection rate (21.5 percent 
at end-2001, according to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)), with Kenya and 
Malawi not far behind, at 15 percent each, and Rwanda and Tanzania following with 8.9 and 7.8 percent, 
respectively. - 16 - 
 
Being more strategic 
 
The need for FAD to respond rapidly to requests for short-term assistance, whether 
program-related or not, is unlikely to diminish over the medium term, given the identified 
weaknesses of many PEM systems in Anglophone Africa. In addition, as discussed above, this 
should be recognized as an essential and valuable role in certain contexts, where fiscal 
imbalances are acute, and is best suited to the existing mode of FAD TA. However, it should 
also be noted that FAD is not simply responsive to program-related demands, but often 
identifies weaknesses and works proactively with governments to reform PEM systems.  
 
In designing assistance strategies and reviewing requests for TA, FAD should give more 
consideration to the institutional and governance environment, as well as to the technical 
deficiencies of the PEM system. One way to address these challenges and promote ownership 
is to integrate PEM issues into national poverty reduction strategies (PRSs) and supporting 
programs such as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The HIPC assessment 
and action plan process is one potential mechanism for aligning TA in PEM with the 
national PRS in some countries. The framework provides a comprehensive diagnostic 
approach that takes account of the priorities and capacity of government to design its own 
PEM reform plan incorporating all relevant donors. If successful, the approach could be 
rolled out in some non-HIPC countries and reassessments could be made periodically rather 
than on an ad hoc basis. However, ensuring that the action plan is adequately reflected in the 
national PRS or PRGF would require more coordination with national authorities and other 
donors at the policy level. 
 
In 2002, FAD initiated a series of experimental internal Fiscal Strategy Briefs (FSBs) to 
better prioritize its TA program. Since then, FSBs have been prepared for more than 
40 countries, seven of which are for countries within the review. Early experience suggests 
that the FSBs may prove a useful instrument, in terms of both contributing to 
TA prioritization and strengthening FAD’s dialogue with the area departments and external 
partners. In this way reform priorities can be more clearly linked to macroeconomic and 
institutional vulnerabilities. 
 
The need for continuing, albeit reduced, reliance on resident advisors to provide TA 
underscores the importance of FAD’s quality assurance processes at headquarters in 
recruiting, backstopping, and managing these advisors. Throughout the period, the 
procedures and processes have been improved in each area on the basis of lessons learned. 
There has been an increasing emphasis on the advisors’ terms of reference and recruitment. 
Country authorities and area departments are now more involved in drafting the TOR, which 
stresses clarity in the areas of focus, expected outputs, and detailed work plans of the 
assignment. This, combined with a greater emphasis on backstopping, impartial inspections, 
and reporting (technical and personnel), has improved the monitoring and evaluation of 
advisors’ performance and more generally FAD’s management of TA. 
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Coordinating our work with other medium-term capacity-building efforts 
In addition to the measures outlined above to improve the coordination and country 
ownership of a broad PEM strategy, the report also suggests the importance of better 
coordinating our largely short-term TA interventions with the longer-term TA projects and 
programs undertaken by other TA providers. Three main areas were identified as important: 
 
•  Selective support for the introduction of MTEFs. This would mainly take the form of 
“nuts-and-bolts” TA on budget preparation (for example, improved budget 
classification) and ensuring the realism of the macroeconomic envelope within which 
such exercises are conducted.  
•  Similarly selective support for IFMISs, in particular at the conceptual design stage. 
Involvement should be conditional on a judgment that the preconditions for success 
exist, and should have a well-defined exit point (based on a realistic time frame for 
implementation).  
•  Modernization of the legal framework for PEM. FAD’s advice should be directed to 
ensuring that the underlying budget process that is adopted is realistic and not overly 
ambitious for the country’s administrative capacity.  
Areas of specialization  
The broad categories of FAD TA appear to be in line with the major priorities as reflected in 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) or Fund programs. With regard to budget 
preparation, this would imply that FAD should continue its current work in introducing and 
refining budget classification approaches in line with international standards, strengthening 
budget processes, improving the budget calendar, and assisting ministries of finance to 
develop their fiscal analytical capacity (including more realistic revenue and expenditure 
forecasting). In terms of budget execution, this would imply that FAD should continue to 
strengthen fiscal reporting and, sometimes in conjunction with the IMF Statistics 
Department (STA), address general data quality issues of concern to Fund program work. 
However, the priorities in this area should be made more explicit than in the past. In 
particular, FAD should continue its emphasis on establishing commitment controls and 
strengthening cash management but should be more selective in the introduction of such 
systems, which should be seen as involving a package of supporting elements. If these 
elements cannot be met, FAD should focus first on removing the impediments to their 
establishment. 
 
With limited resources—and also taking account of the comparative advantage of other 
providers—there is only a small margin for FAD to undertake TA in new, or relatively new, 
areas. However, this evaluation, combined with experience from other reviews, suggests 
some areas where a modest expansion of activities may be considered to support assistance in 
FAD’s normal areas of specialization: assistance with the quality of data associated with 
fiscal decentralization, with the development of internal control systems, and with fiscal - 18 - 
 
sustainability through a focus on debt management (see Box 2). Any TA in these areas would 
need to be well justified and highly focused.  
 
  
Box 2. Selectively Deepening Technical Assistance 
Improving fiscal data in systems undergoing fiscal decentralization  
The overarching policy goal is having effective fiscal control exercised across general government, with 
efficient and effective execution of expenditure responsibilities at the subnational level while ensuring 
that the central government’s responsibility in macroeconomic management is not compromised. In the 
short term this would involve efforts to improve coverage, timeliness, and consolidation of fiscal plans 
and reports, particularly where these enable compliance with the enhanced HIPC debt relief reporting 
requirements.  
Internal controls 
To date, much of FAD’s expenditure control efforts have been dedicated to the management of 
expenditures on transfers and other recurrent transactions, while leaving aside controls of personnel 
expenditures that constitute the single most important current expenditure class. Better expenditure 
control may require strengthening personnel management, bolstering the role of the ministry of finance 
with respect to personnel, and creating a reliable database of government personnel. Expenditure control 
benefits will also flow through the introduction of a standardized, computerized human resources 
management system. FAD should play only a supporting role in this, cooperating with others who are 
willing to provide the software and bear the considerable implementation and training costs required. 
Longer term, the goal of better expenditure control will depend on the quality of the internal control and 
audit process. This would usually involve the following dimensions: a clear and agreed definition of 
internal auditors’ tasks; establishment of line ministry audit committees, with a central audit committee 
in the MOF; a clear demarcation of responsibilities in relation to external audit; and a restructuring of 
work practices. 
Debt management 
FAD’s approach in strengthening debt management would usually follow three main steps: (1) assuring 
that there is an effective organizational consolidation of debt and aid functions and a restructuring of 
tasks; (2) creating an integrated debt recording and management system (DRMS) to track all loans, from 
the time of agreement through the various stages of disbursement and the associated debt service 
payments (there are some standard software packages to facilitate this); and (3) using the DRMS, with 
the appropriate upgrading of skills, to assist in implementing debt management strategy with an 
integrated risk management framework. 
 
 
 
Summary implications for TA delivery  
Many of the improvements in TA planning, management, and delivery—to which this 
evaluation points—are to varying degrees already being implemented as a result of changes 
in FAD’s work practices in the recent past. The main operational implications may be 
summarized as follows: 
 
•  Place PEM TA into a more strategic framework. Prioritization of TA should be 
country-specific, and take account of institutional and governance factors as well as 
technical priorities and assistance from other donors. This suggests more discussion 
and joint consideration at the outset of what assistance is required and who should - 19 - 
 
provide it. Ideally the PEM reform strategy would also be reflected in the countries’ 
own poverty reduction strategy. It should, however, be recognized that the degree to 
which TA can be implemented within the context of a comprehensive, country-led 
TA strategy will often be constrained by the level of PEM development, domestic 
capacity, and the state of governance and institutional development. However, FAD’s 
TA should, where possible, still attempt to support and be coordinated with longer-
term or more comprehensive reform efforts by national authorities and other donors.  
•  Seek national commitment. Where possible, the strategic framework could provide 
a basis for mutual commitment—the countries agreeing to put into action appropriate 
reforms at certain stages, and FAD’s advice being similarly shaped. It may be that 
FAD assistance should be withdrawn when countries fail to put the reform steps into 
place in a satisfactory manner. This approach will build on the practice now in place, 
in which resident experts are normally appointed for six-month renewable terms, and 
inspection missions are fielded before long-term assignments are extended. 
•  Pay more attention to follow-up and implementation. There could be a 
strengthening in the oversight, support, and follow-up to our recommendations. FAD 
remains committed to the backstopping role—ensuring that advice is subject to 
quality assurance by leading experts. When countries lose interest in implementing 
good advice, FAD should more speedily review its role. Similarly, if FAD fails to 
address the problems of concern to authorities, then the authorities should be 
encouraged to advise FAD accordingly.  
•  Ensure that TORs are more focused. This requires that FAD better prepare its 
missions, with a more deliberate focus on the resources and the information required 
to deliver the high-quality advice to which FAD aspires. TORs could be more directly 
negotiated with authorities to ensure a shared and well-informed understanding of the 
problems being tackled.  
•  Apply realistic time frames for PEM reforms. Such time frames should be adopted 
in different countries or on different topics, which might require more regular, 
ongoing involvement over longer periods in some countries. Such involvement 
should occur in a manner consistent with the strategic framework referred to above.  
•  Agree on a division of labor with other providers. A decision on the best mode of 
TA delivery should be made in conjunction with other providers and the countries’ 
authorities. Where it can, FAD should support the work of experts engaged by other 
providers—for instance, through information sharing. 
Overall, the approaches outlined imply a more regular interaction with client countries than 
has been the case in the past, with the aim of diagnosing emerging problems and providing 
more focused interventions before problems reach crisis proportions. To be effective, this 
regular interaction should be coordinated with other providers and be nested in an overall 
country TA strategy, in which the authorities display ownership.  - 20 - 
 
 
Some of the adaptations just described will add to costs. Given the overall resource 
constraint, they may therefore need to be accompanied by greater selectivity in responding to 
new requests—that is, providing assistance to a smaller number of countries in any given 
period but with a larger commitment to each country served. 
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I.   DIAGNOSIS OF THE PEM PROBLEMS IN PRIMARILY                                               
ANGLOPHONE AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Drawing on the past work of Public Expenditure Management I Division (P1), the principal 
public expenditure management problems encountered in Anglophone African countries are 
fairly well known, neither are they exclusive to such legacy systems. They can be distilled 
from the relevant technical assistance reports in the PEM area, and these should be read in 
conjunction with the IMF Working Paper by Lienert and Sarraf.
11 They are summarized here 
to give an overview of the range of problems to which FAD’s TA efforts have been directed. 
It should be understood that not all problems exist in all countries, and it should also be 
acknowledged that many countries have recognized at least some of these problems and have 
begun to address them with the assistance of TA from FAD and others.  
 
A.   Budget Preparation Issues 
The process of budget formulation has often suffered from the following weaknesses. 
 
Incremental annual budgeting, no forward medium-term framework 
 
Typically, Anglophone African budgets are traditional in form and in process. They tend to 
be incremental in approach, designed to ensure compliance—typically in some detail—with 
an annual budget appropriation law. The incremental and annual approach often makes it 
difficult to identify the long-term policies the budget is supposed to support and to design 
meaningful programs. At the same time, the lack of forward perspective implies there is no 
basis for making judgments about the future cost implications of present spending decisions 
and, in particular, the recurrent cost implications of investment spending.  
 
Budget based on unrealistic projections 
 
Budget preparation is often characterized by poor revenue forecasting, resulting in 
overambitious expenditure levels. A major feature of Fund programs is to correct for this 
tendency. Of course, revenue forecasting is not easy in commodity-based economies with a 
high degree of dependence on trade taxes and sharp fluctuations in the terms of trade. The 
need for conservatism in the African context is reinforced by the typically narrow tax base 
and weak tax administration. Unfortunately, the lack of realism of budgets has been 
reinforced by under-costing of expenditure programs, where typically some line items are 
consistently under-provisioned. Indeed in the Anglophone system, which typically still 
operates on the basis of “bottom-up” bids of the spending ministries, it is not clear how these 
bids are reconciled with top-down macro limits, except during budget implementation, 
usually by under-provisioning. 
 
                                                 
11 Lienert and Sarraf (2001). - 22 - 
 
The result of such unrealistic projections has been profound, with important and needed 
government programs proving to be unsustainable. However, instead of reforming policies 
and downsizing government operations, governments have tended to overspend, or to 
maintain projected cash levels but create arrears, or simply to underfund some items. 
Typically, underfunding has occurred on interest on debt, utilities, and transfers to state-
owned enterprises, along with squeezing operation and maintenance spending to cover the 
cost of wages. The net result has been an inefficient composition of expenditure, and a 
persistent accumulation of arrears that creates moral hazard and removes the incentive for 
realistic costing.  
 
Dual budgets: recurrent vs. development  
 
The recent budget reform initiatives, including the MTEF, are designed to move countries 
away from separate recurrent and development budgets. The latter is one aspect of traditional 
budgeting wisdom that advanced the “golden rule”—recurrent spending should be covered 
by revenues, and borrowing should be used only for investment purposes. This underlying 
premise has been questioned, with the increasing emphasis on the importance of human 
rather than physical capital in the development process. Additionally, despite the move of 
donors from project-related to program-related assistance, the split between development and 
recurrent budgets persists. Indeed, this bifurcation has generally been aggravated by being 
institutionalized in the functional split of the MOF in charge of the recurrent budget, and the 
planning ministry or the President’s office in charge of the development budget. 
Coordination of expenditures between recurrent and development budgets has been made 
even more difficult by the tendency of donors to dominate the composition and size of 
investment budgets, and to bypass regular government procedures—the latter ostensibly to 
speed up disbursement and avoid corrupt practices. Despite such efforts, slow disbursement 
and lack of administrative capacity have often resulted in underexecution of the development 
budget. Foreign financing usually requires domestic counterpart expenditures, which has 
often proved a problem, and the lack of information makes monitoring difficult. 
 
Detailed line item budgeting, emphasizing inputs without much regard to functions or 
programs  
 
Budgets have been designed for compliance purposes rather than for policy analysis and 
planning. The traditional budget thus tended to be very detailed, stressing the institutions 
responsible for spending and the detailed objects of expenditure. The lack of more relevant 
functional or program classifications means that the policy objectives underlying spending 
have often been lost in the details. Similarly, it is difficult to distinguish between existing and 
new policies—complicated by the tendency to introduce new policies during the year.  
 
Without adequate control from top-down limits, these additional commitments have tended 
to undermine fiscal discipline. Often revenue-raising measures are needed but no new 
revenues are raised, resulting in supplementary appropriations, arrears, or an explicit 
widening of the fiscal deficit. The MTEF process has attempted to tackle this feature of - 23 - 
 
traditional budgets by developing sectoral envelopes based on sector expenditure plans that 
try to intermediate between macro-fiscal targets and detailed line item expenditures.  
 
Coverage often incomplete 
 
Traditionally, budgets have been designed on a rather centralized view of government; hence 
the coverage of expenditures is generally limited to the central government plus transfers to 
local governments and a few major autonomous funds. However, extrabudgetary 
funds (EBFs) are often excluded, and the budget process still lacks transparency regarding 
transfers to lower levels of government, and their subsequent accountability for use of funds. 
This has proved an increasing problem for many countries, as they have pursued a deliberate 
policy of decentralization, making the operations of lower levels of government increasingly 
important. Coverage of all government operations is typically incomplete, with autonomous 
agencies still budgeting on a net basis and “below-the-line funds” often creating several 
financial management problems (e.g., in The Gambia and Zimbabwe) that are invisible in the 
budget. Moreover, poor budget execution control has created incentives to evade and hide 
operations in various ways: implicit subsidies via tax expenditures, uncollected on-lent loans, 
equity participation and capital injections, and unrecorded quasi-fiscal operations. The 
consequence is that the budget document is often incomplete in its coverage of government 
operations. 
 
Unrealistic budget timetable  
 
Arising from the perception that the estimates are unrealistic, the budget has lost its 
credibility, with some obvious consequences. One of the most obvious symptoms is that the 
budget timetable does not allow for meaningful policy decision making. Often spending 
ministries do not comply with the budget department’s call circular. Important political 
decisions affecting spending may be made late in the budget cycle. Budget preparation 
allows little time for parliamentary discussion. Budgets are often adopted late, after the new 
fiscal year has begun. 
 
B.   Budget Execution Issues 
While problems in budget execution are often merely the consequence of unrealistic budget 
preparation, there are some distinctive characteristics of implementing budgets in 
Anglophone Africa that have created their own specific concerns. 
 
Expenditure control: a persistent problem 
 
There are a number of points in the expenditure process at which the MOF can exert central 
control. The first control point is the issuing of warrants that provide spending agencies the 
authority to spend—a major instrument of control in countries such as Kenya and Nigeria. 
This has tended not to work well because it has been based on unrealistic budget estimates. 
The second control point is on commitments. However, information on commitments 
generally is not adequately maintained in spending ministries’ vote books, and not reported - 24 - 
 
centrally to the MOF in a reliable or timely manner. The third control point is cash funding. 
Often, there is evidence of a resort to “cash budgeting” (e.g., in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Zambia in the 1990s) based on cash availability. Usually, the cash releases are below warrant 
levels, and the latter are often below budget authorizations. Ultimately, these releases 
represent an attempt to do through budget execution what should have been done in budget 
preparation—adjust expenditure policies to meet changed resource availability. These 
attempts have been disruptive to service delivery and, because of poor cash planning, the 
system of control has reverted to cash rationing—resulting in arrears and nontransparent cash 
reallocations. In turn, this provides an incentive for ministries to increase their off-budget 
activities (e.g., not reporting receipts raised by ministries). Of course, the existence of arrears 
itself can lead to pressure for corruption, because of decisions about who in the queue should 
be paid first.  
 
Modernization not facilitated by the budget management system 
 
The decentralized nature of PEM systems in Anglophone African countries is often viewed 
as complicating modernization efforts through computerization or administrative and 
management reforms, compared with some more centralized systems. Even in those 
countries that have not decentralized government expenditure to lower levels of government, 
the expenditure process in Anglophone African countries is typically characterized by a 
relatively high degree of decentralized management. Spending ministries are mainly 
responsible for budget execution, with officials in line ministries authorized to initiate and 
manage each step of the expenditure process. Generally the minister of finance will issue 
quarterly or annual warrants to the accounting officers (AOs), who are the heads of the line 
ministries, commonly the Permanent Secretary. When compared with some more centralized 
PEM systems, this approach can complicate efforts to introduce management or 
administrative reforms, or to computerize expenditure control and management systems. This 
is due to both the technical difficulties of linking up many separate units, particularly where 
infrastructure is poor, and the need for additional coordination among sections of government 
in an environment where capacity is often extremely weak. 
 
For example, the recent or existing payment systems in many of the countries reviewed in 
this study were set up for manual operation, and their relative simplicity should be regarded 
as a great strength. However, this is also a weakness from the wider view of spending 
control—one that takes more than the last stage of spending into account—and one that 
views control from a general management viewpoint rather than from the narrow one of 
financial compliance with the approved budget. The possibility of moving to this wider view 
of control depends largely on the degree of computerization that is possible. In this regard, it 
has often been claimed that the budget management found in Anglophone African countries 
does not support easy computerization. 
 
This may be an oversimplification, since the experience in Anglophone Africa varies 
significantly. In some countries, payment is carried out by the spending units (e.g., in Malawi 
and Zambia), but in others it is centralized (e.g., The Gambia, Lesotho, and Tanzania). 
However, the recording and control of prior stages of the spending process are typically - 25 - 
 
undertaken in the spending ministries (SMs). These prior stages, in terms of commitments 
made and pending obligations, cause many spending problems. The need to record more 
speedily and consolidate this information has led to the development of integrated 
computerized accounting and payment systems. Of course, there are generally other 
influential factors in addition to the design of the expenditure management system. Many 
countries are not able to introduce computerization because of lack of resources and 
administrative capacity or human resources. This constraint in developing more effective 
budget controls through computerized FMISs is discussed below.  
 
Weak internal control and internal audit 
 
The internal controls in the Anglophone African system are designed to be decentralized, so 
the AO in the spending ministry, usually the Permanent Secretary, is made responsible for 
proper utilization and control of his appropriation. In this, he is typically allowed much 
discretion. However, in some countries, one finds a centrally administered internal audit 
function with internal auditors assigned by the MOF to the SMs, ostensibly to assist the AO. 
Often this centrally controlled audit has been introduced to limit the discretion of AOs, and 
not surprisingly it is undermined by them. Universally, however, the level of control offered 
is limited to basic checking for financial compliance, with internal auditors often lacking 
proper training. In some countries with low salary levels, the internal audit’s checking exists 
only as one extra step for extracting economic rent. Not surprisingly, some countries have 
had to resort to higher-level investigative units to impose discipline—for example, 
anticorruption offices or commissions (e.g., Kenya and Uganda). Generally, the case for this 
extra layer of control is difficult to justify in terms of the results. 
 
Accounting framework 
 
Most of the Anglophone African countries in this review use a cash basis for accounting. 
While relatively easy to operate, such a system has distinct limitations for compliance 
purposes and especially for providing useful information for management purposes. For 
example, a cash-based system does not usually track expenditure commitments. Another 
limitation is that the general ledger (GL), the principal recording mechanism, typically has 
incomplete coverage of government operations. While set up to record transactions against 
appropriations, it covers only the strict budgetary operations. Since the system is 
decentralized, in that the accounts are kept by the spending ministry and reported to the 
MOF, this allows some discretion and much leeway for “creative accounting.” Typically, the 
Office of the Accountant General (OAG) in the MOF consolidates the accounts of the 
ministries and presents the final accounts to parliament as the Annual Accounts of the 
government. Unfortunately, this is often viewed as its primary function, and only as a 
distinctly secondary function, if at all, does the OAG generate reports as an input to in-year 
fiscal management. A feature of the Anglophone system is that the OAG, although reporting 
to the Finance Minister, is somewhat independent, and his office is often separated from the 
core functions of the MOF. Sometimes, this has led to a disconnect between those 
authorizing payments and the OAG, which must execute and fund the discharge of these 
authorizations. - 26 - 
 
Government banking arrangements 
 
Generally, the traditional management of government cash resources has been fragmented. 
The concept of a consolidated fund, which is close to a TSA, has typically been undermined 
in a number of ways. As a fiduciary safeguard, donors such as the World Bank have often 
insisted on special project accounts so they can monitor the inflow and outflow of monies. 
Often, other special accounts have been maintained outside the regular government account. 
It has also been common practice in the decentralized Anglophone system for SMs to open 
accounts in commercial banks for both their receipts and expenditures. The profusion of 
government accounts means that it is not surprising that problems of idle cash balances, poor 
cash planning, higher costs of financing, and so on, are encountered. In some Anglophone 
African countries, government cash management is in any case constrained by a poorly 
developed banking system unable to operate zero-balance government accounts that would 
allow the government greater control over cash balances in commercial bank accounts. 
 
External audit 
 
In the Anglophone African system, the external audit function is generally entrusted to an 
independent Auditor General (AG), reporting to the legislature. A major problem is the delay 
in the OAG submitting annual accounts to the AG for audit and submission to parliament. 
The function is typically handicapped by a lack of skills and capacity and hence its inability 
to audit accounts in a timely way. Because of this, audited accounts are often submitted with 
a lag of many years and hence lose their relevance. Even when relevant, mechanisms for 
following up audit recommendations are typically inadequate. In addition, key legislative 
committees, such as the Public Accounts Committee, are weak. In such an environment, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the final accounts do not generate much public interest. 
 
C.   Wider Issues with an Impact on Technical Assistance 
It has been debated whether the problems of PEM systems encountered in Anglophone 
African countries arise for systemic reasons, or from the way the systems are operated. 
Probably a mixture of both factors has contributed to these problems; some of the most likely 
influences are identified here. 
 
Lack of commitment and accountability 
 
It has been argued that lack of budget discipline within the executive branch and a failure to 
comply with existing financial regulations have often been at the root of many of the PEM 
problems of Anglophone African countries. Although AOs are in principle personally 
financially responsible for ensuring the expenditure control of their votes, they are not 
usually sanctioned if they fail to abide by the legal framework or financial regulations. 
 
Corruption has been endemic in typically low-paying and bloated civil services. Even today, 
governments often act as employers of first resort. Over the years, with the resultant rapid 
expansion in the civil service sector, real wages often fell drastically. Then the managers of - 27 - 
 
PEM systems and their lower-level staff lost their motivation, and not surprisingly, the 
systems deteriorated. Low salaries also undoubtedly contributed to the growth of 
opportunistic corruption.  
 
Weak central control by the MOF 
 
Many of the problems arise from basic organizational weaknesses of the MOF, which has 
failed to evolve to meet the new economic challenges faced by most of the Anglophone 
African countries. Expenditure policy and financial controls are largely assigned to SMs, 
with the AOs having power to make commitments against their approved budget 
appropriations largely without reference to the MOF. If, for wider fiscal considerations, the 
MOF tries to exert some pressure on the rate of commitments being made, it is dependent on 
the timely and accurate reporting of the SMs, which is often deficient. Procurement remains a 
source of corruption. Accountability at the SM level is generally deficient, so even when 
accounts are produced and audited, and deficiencies are found, there is typically no follow-up 
by the MOF or by parliamentary committees. As indicated previously, the AOs are not 
disciplined by the MOF for overspending and financial irregularities.  
 
Institutional fragmentation  
 
Control suffers owing to the split between budget preparation and budget execution functions 
in the MOF. The OAG in charge of recording execution of the budget and its cash execution 
typically operates separately from the rest of the MOF, which is primarily concerned with the 
annual budget preparation exercise and only secondarily with budget implementation. The 
consequences of this have had a negative impact on budget management. First, there is a 
poor flow of financial information on government operations. The OAG produces accounts 
for compliance purposes but does not primarily supply management information, and is often 
more concerned with ex post annual accounts than in-year budget execution (see the 
discussion of the accounting framework above). Second, budget preparation and execution 
are disconnected: warrants are issued by the budget department without knowing the extent 
of previous utilization. Since annual accounts are slow to come, the annual budget is usually 
prepared on the basis of the previous year’s budget estimates rather than the provisional 
outturn, which typically is far different. Third, the financial management function is 
fragmented, with different departments concerned with debt and aid flows, and typically not 
integrated with OAG’s accounting or the rest of MOF operations. Similarly, those 
responsible for managing personnel expenditures often do not coordinate closely with 
personnel managers (either in SMs or in a dedicated central ministry), resulting in poor 
control over the wage bill.  
 
Poor legal framework 
 
In several cases, the legal framework and its accompanying financial instructions have 
changed little since independence, and are largely oriented toward creating a compliance and 
control framework based on traditional line item budgeting. Normally, this framework 
provides adequate procedures for budget preparation, expenditure control, and fiscal - 28 - 
 
reporting and auditing. The more pressing need is perhaps not to rewrite existing legislation, 
but to ensure that there is adherence to its provisions.  
 
On the other hand, with governance issues dominating PEM in African countries, there may 
be a case for introducing fiscal accountability-type legislation (e.g., as in South Africa). 
While fiscal responsibility laws have become a feature of some “progressive” middle-income 
countries, their use in less-developed countries is rare. In the latter countries FAD advice has 
generally focused on consolidating and improving budget management procedures in the 
main budget system law. The emphasis has been on introducing a modern Public Finance Act 
to replace the usually dated legislation inherited from colonial times.  
 
In this context there may also be a case for clarifying the relative powers between the 
executive branch and the legislature. In principle, the Anglophone budget system centers on 
the supremacy of the legislature over the executive branch. However, this has been qualified 
in a number of ways. Most Anglophone African countries after independence saw the rise of 
strong presidencies, often in the context of a one-party political system, or part of a military 
regime. The executive branch thus acquired considerable powers. At the same time, treasury 
control has always been recognized as very important in budget execution, so the MOF is 
recognized as first among equals in terms of ministerial hierarchy. Sometimes, this is not so 
clear in a presidential system, with a powerful President’s office or a powerful planning 
ministry. While in the original Westminster model powerful legislative committees 
(especially expenditure review committees) backed by external audit countered the 
executive’s powers, in Anglophone African countries these are often toothless watchdogs. In 
any case, audit offices generally are weak institutions, with no real independence, and lack 
expertise and staff. Common problems in audit offices are the poor wage levels and lack of 
motivation and incentives. 
 
D.   Implications for FAD’s Technical Assistance 
The previous review of the PEM problems in Anglophone Africa is worthwhile if only to 
highlight their widespread nature—for many client countries there are few areas in their PEM 
system that do not require strengthening in some way. Given the scale and scope of the 
problems and FAD’s limited resources, there is an obvious need to prioritize, concentrating 
on some areas more than others. However, it must be recognized that when dealing with a 
system, one component of the system will impact another. Concentrating on improving one 
area runs the risk that improvements there will be undermined by weaknesses in another. 
Moreover, by prioritizing, one can almost never avoid the criticism of being too narrow in 
focus, and of failing to take into account the wider picture. This underlying dilemma is 
evident in the next section, where FAD’s experience in providing TA is reviewed.  - 29 - 
 
II.   OVERVIEW OF PAST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
A.   Overview of FAD Technical Assistance in PEM Input 
For the purposes of this study, a sample of 10 African users of FAD TA in the period 
FY1998–FY2003 was chosen as a basis of analysis.
12 As is evident from the listing of TA 
provided since 1997, for the majority of countries in the sample, FAD TA inputs have been 
provided consistently over the period reviewed (see Figure 1 and Table 1, showing the field 
time of staff and experts in person-years). A significant share of TA in PEM has been 
directed to the countries covered by this evaluation. Between 1998 and 2003, they consumed 
an average of 54 percent of all Fund TA in PEM to the Africa region as a whole. This region 
has also been the largest single consumer of Fund TA in PEM, consuming an average of 
35 percent of the total TA in PEM provided by FAD during the period. The share of Fund 
TA in PEM going to Africa has also increased in recent years, averaging over 40 percent of 
total Fund TA in PEM in FY2002 and FY2003 (this is partly due to the decline in the amount 
received by the transition countries in Eastern Europe). TA in PEM constituted around 
50 percent of total TA provided by FAD to Africa during the period. 
 
It is also evident from Table 2 that there has been an increasing trend in TA provided to this 
sample of countries. Indeed, Table 2 and Figure 1 understate the level of resources directed 
toward these activities as they refer only to TA field time. It is estimated that FAD’s total TA 
delivery, including headquarters time related to mission and expert assignments, is around 
50 percent more than total field time. Apart from the growth in TA, two dimensions of this 
delivery are worth noting: the mix of TA inputs delivered and the subject areas covered. 
 
The mix of technical assistance inputs 
 
Even a cursory examination of Table 2 shows that the mix of TA, between missions and 
resident advisors, has varied markedly among countries. For the majority of the Anglophone 
African countries, the most significant TA input has taken the form of resident advisors 
rather than missions. The details are shown in Figure 1, which gives the distribution over the 
period FY1998–FY2003 of FAD’s TA by these two different modes of delivery. The mix has 
changed over the years. If one calculates the share in this country sample, the proportion of 
TA in 1998 delivered by means of missions was 30 percent, whereas in 2002, the last year 
for which complete data are presented, the proportion of missions in the total had fallen to 
15 percent. However, the mix is highly variable, and typically the two forms of delivery are 
related. FAD’s approach throughout the period was to send a diagnostic mission to precede 
the assignment of an advisor, and thereafter much smaller missions and briefer follow-up or 
inspection missions were expected. From this perspective, the switch to resident advisors 
really reflects the sharp increase in TA delivered during this period, especially until 2001. 
                                                 
12 The 10 countries were generally the largest consumers of FAD TA covered by one of the two PEM TA 
divisions within FAD. The more general development and economic context of six of the countries covered in 
this study is presented in some detail in Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren (2001). - 30 - 
 
The areas covered in technical assistance 
 
Table 1 indicates the main areas of TA provided to the sample countries, as captured by the 
major subject area codes. It should be noted that these are highly aggregated and, therefore, 
are unable to capture the full scope of the work of missions or resident advisors. However, 
even at this aggregate level, it is evident that FAD’s advice focused mainly on budget 
execution issues: expenditure controls, cash management, and fiscal reporting. It is not 
surprising that these are issues that also tended to be key aspects of Fund programs and in 
effect, underline the nature of FAD’s technical assistance for PEM as a support function for 
Fund program operations. At the same time, this approach has raised the question whether, in 
following this path, PEM TA was applied to short-term problem solving and interim 
solutions rather than to longer-term reform plans. These TA priorities will be reviewed more 
fully below.  
 
Table 1. Main Areas of FAD TA and PEM Areas Incorporated into Programs Agreed upon 
with the Fund (FY1998–FY2002) 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: FAD Technical Assistance Reports, 1998–2003; Terms of Reference and Reports of Advisors,     
1998–2003; Program documents. 
 
Notes: BF, Budget formulation procedures/timetables; BC, Budget classification; BCo., Budget coverage and 
consolidation of recurrent and development budgets; EC, Expenditure control–commitment control 
systems/arrears; CM, Cash management: cash release and banking arrangements; FR, Fiscal reporting: includes 
accounting processes and chart of accounts; IFMIS, Integrated financial management information systems; 
Other, Fiscal decentralization (Ethiopia and Uganda), debt management, internal control/internal audit (Kenya, 
Zambia), and macro-fiscal analysis (Tanzania). 
 
Budget Preparation Budget Execution  Other
Country/Program  BF  BC  BCo. EC CM FR IFMIS 
Ethiopia, 2000/03  XX X
Gambia, 1998/01  X X X
Ghana, 1995/99  XXX
1999/02 XXX
Kenya, 2000/03  XXXX  X
Malawi, 2000/03  X X X X X 
Nigeria, 2000/01  XX X X  
Rwanda, 2002/03  X X X X
Tanzania, 2002/03  X X X
Uganda, 2002/04  XX X
Zambia, 2002/04  XXX
X: Main Area of Technical Assistance
 
Included in IMF program as: 
Prior Action
Structural Performance Criteria
Structural Benchmark- 31 - 
 
The remainder of this section provides an overview of the main features of this TA program 
by country, by subject matter, and by management of the program. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of TA in PEM Between FAD Mission and Resident Advisors 
(In person-years of field time, FY1998–FY2003) 
 
 
 
B.   Overview of Country Experiences 
In Ethiopia, FAD was involved in PEM TA only in FY2003; some small inputs were made 
in the context of an expenditure policy TA mission dealing with intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. Recently, TA input has started to increase, mainly as a result of the demands of the 
HIPC initiative, and Ethiopia’s inclusion in the Eastern African Regional Technical 
Assistance Center (AFRITAC East). 
 
In The Gambia, FAD input was in two discrete phases, separated by a long break related to 
a military coup. In the early 1990s, FAD’s TA was directed toward integrating budget 
management with macroeconomic analysis and policy formulation and the development of 
accounting systems (with some limited computerization). Since the late 1990s, it has been 
focused on budget execution, specifically improving accounting and fiscal reporting systems 
(while an IFMIS and MTEF are being developed with World Bank support) and improving 
the budget classification system. In both phases, TA was provided through stand-alone TA 
missions and long-term resident advice.  
 
Progress in The Gambia has been hindered by political instability. The military regime 
abandoned the sound PEM practices built up with the support of TA in the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, many of the basic reforms in budget preparation appear to have survived the 
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period. More serious problems remain in the area of budget execution. Even though this has 
been the focus of FAD’s TA in recent years, progress has been mixed. Limited gains have 
been made in implementing “flash” fiscal reports and in accounting for HIPC inflows, in 
streamlining the so-called “below-the-line accounts,” and in closing 1992–1999 accounts. 
These reforms are, however, short term and remedial in nature and need to be replaced by 
long-term, more sustainable, systemic reform. This task at present falls under a World Bank 
project. 
 
In Ghana, FAD TA was relatively small until very recently. For the major part of the period, 
other TA providers took the lead in PEM, largely under the ambit of a World Bank reform 
program. FAD input has increased markedly since 2000, particularly in response to a serious 
macroeconomic downturn. This revealed a number of weaknesses in the PEM system, in 
particular in the areas of expenditure control and arrears, the quality of fiscal data, and debt 
management. In response, FAD fielded a number of TA missions and stationed a resident 
advisor in Accra. The key responsibilities of the advisor’s terms of reference focused on the 
quantification and control of expenditure arrears. Associated reforms in accounting, fiscal 
reporting, and cash and debt management have also been pursued. 
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Table 2. Technical Assistance in PEM: Input Summary of  Person-Years of Field Time)
1 
 
 
Source: IMF internal reports for fiscal years 1998 to 2003; fiscal year begins May 1. 
 
 
1 In Table 1 and Figure 1, for missions and advisors whose term encompassed more than one fiscal year (FY), 
the data for the duration of the assignment, excluding extensions, are reflected in the FY when the 
corresponding mission or advisors’ contract commenced. This, combined with the report of February 11, 2003, 
results in only partial coverage for FY2003. 
 
1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  Total
Ethiopia 
Missions  -      -        -     -    -    0.412  0.412
Advisors  -        -        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
TOTAL  -        -        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.412  0.412
The Gambia 
Missions  -        -        0.162 -    0.058 0.05       0.265
Advisors  -        -        0.115 0.997 1.097 0.997  3.207
TOTAL  -        -        0.277 0.997 1.155 1.043  3.473
Ghana 
Missions  -        -        -    0.373 0.350 0.108  0.831
Advisors  -        -        -    -    1.499 0.912  2.411
TOTAL  -        -        -    0.373 1.849 1.020  3.242
Kenya 
Missions  0.119  -        0.327 0.162 -    -        0.608
Advisors  -        -        -    1.097 0.185 0.000  1.282
TOTAL  0.119  -        0.327 1.259 0.185 0.000  1.890
Malawi 
Missions  0.019  -        0.088 0.335 0.096 0.046  0.585
Advisors  0.997  1.008 0.611 0.499 -    0.85       3.962
TOTAL  1.016  1.008 0.699 0.833 0.096 0.894  4.547
Nigeria
Missions  -        0.054 0.512 0.492 0.192 0.000  1.250
Advisors  -        -        0.015 0.733 0.496 0.904  2.149
TOTAL  -        0.054 0.527 1.226 0.688 0.904  3.399
Rwanda 
Missions  0.081  -        0.015 0.054 0.142 0.000  0.292
Advisors  0.815  0.615 1.800 1.247 0.655 0.042  5.174
TOTAL  0.896  0.615 1.815 1.300 0.797 0.042  5.466
Tanzania 
Missions  0.188  0.000 -    0.531 0.158 0.000  0.877
Advisors  0.023  1.086 0.771 0.164 0.123 0.000  2.167
TOTAL  0.212  1.086 0.771 0.695 0.281 0.000  3.044
Uganda 
Missions  0.673  -        0.019 0.073 0.027 0.023  0.815
Advisors  0.000  1.488 2.302 1.861 1.499 0.115  7.266
TOTAL  0.673  1.488 2.322 1.935 1.526 0.138  8.081
Zambia 
Missions  0.004  -        0.085 0.127 0.135 0.069  0.419
Advisors  0.782  0.997 0.585 0.997 0.997   0.997     5.356
TOTAL  0.786  0.997 0.669 1.124 1.132 1.066  5.775
TOTAL OF ALL COUNTRIES 
Missions  1.085  0.054 1.208 2.146 1.158 0.704  6.354
Advisors  2.617  5.194 6.199 7.596 6.550 4.816  32.974
GRAND TOTAL  3.702  5.248 7.407 9.742 7.708 5.520  39.327  - 34 - 
 
Progress in Ghana, both during and before FAD’s intensive involvement, has been quite 
limited. Although adverse economic conditions have periodically complicated the task of 
reform, political neglect and institutional capacity have also undermined reform efforts. 
FAD’s recent TA strategy has been in response to sequential crises rather than in guiding a 
reform process. In its areas of focus, some progress has been made but implementation has 
generally been slow and partial, and the basic order in the budget system that was sought has 
not yet been established. In the broader context, sound medium-term reform initiatives have 
tended to divert attention from ensuring that the existing PEM system continues to function 
adequately.  
 
In Kenya, FAD has been involved sporadically in delivering TA throughout most of the 
period, with a short period of resident advice in the mid-1990s and a longer period 
throughout 2001. FAD has concentrated its advice on expenditure control. In the latter 
period, the focus was on three main areas: reorganizing the institutional framework for PEM 
(including those required to accommodate the MTEF initiative); improving expenditure 
control through control of commitments, managing personnel expenditures, and internal audit 
(with the latter being the subject of a dedicated TA mission); and improving financial 
management.  
 
Overall, the impact of TA was disappointing, indicating the low level of commitment from 
the authorities across the different areas reflected in the advisor’s TOR. In some cases, the 
authorities chose to ignore Fund advice and continued with a poor management approach—
for example, in introducing separate bank accounts for ministries at the district level, and the 
rejection of virtually all recommendations on the reorganization of the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning (MOFP). In other cases, changes in personnel affected the response of the 
authorities. Political factors, such as endemic corruption and the run-up to elections in 2002, 
also complicated TA delivery. 
 
In Malawi, FAD has been intensively involved over many years. During the period reviewed 
in this study, FAD devoted three years of resident advice with substantial headquarters-based 
support. The primary focus of the TA has been to establish budget execution and reporting 
systems that enable expenditure control to be meaningfully applied. However, the advisors’ 
TORs have been wide ranging. In particular, they have consistently included substantial 
elements relating to budget preparation. Prior to 1998, this assistance focused on budget 
classification issues and advice on the development of the MTEF. The TA on the MTEF, 
however, was predominantly delivered by the World Bank and, lately, by the Department for 
International Development (DFID). 
 
Some changes to systems and procedures have been introduced with the assistance of FAD 
TA. However, despite these improvements, the basic performance of the system remains 
poor, in part owing to political factors. Expenditure indiscipline is still rife, new arrears 
continue to be built up, fiscal reporting is weak, the MTEF is still not a credible prioritization 
tool, and the IFMIS has yet to be rolled out. In the early years of TA delivery, significant 
progress was made in the area of budget classification, including the development of a basic 
program format that could be used for constructing realistic budget estimates of government   - 35 - 
 
activities. In the area of budget execution, however, progress was more limited. Cash 
rationing never developed into a cash management system based on forward planning, and 
commitment controls have been very slow to take hold. Fiscal reporting has been a continual 
problem, and while progress has been made in reforming the formal processes and 
introducing reporting formats, there has been difficulty in enforcing these new systems. 
Action on a number of reforms was neglected in order to allow the development of an 
IFMIS. However, this project has been plagued by bureaucratic delay and weak 
implementation.  
 
In Nigeria, FAD’s input has been mostly concentrated in the period since 1999, with a 
number of TA missions supplemented with three short-term experts within the MOF and the 
OAG. The demand for these missions largely originated from difficulties arising in area 
department surveillance and programs. TA missions covered all aspects of the PEM system, 
including budget preparation, organization of the budget management, cash management and 
government banking arrangements, government accounting, payroll auditing, fiscal reporting, 
computerization of the financial management system, and finally fiscal federalism with 
emphasis on PEM issues. However, FAD’s resident advisor’s work focused on improving 
budget execution, including accounting and fiscal reporting. 
 
Progress in Nigeria has been mixed, with very little impact on budget preparation, primarily 
owing to the authorities’ reluctance to accept and act on FAD recommendations. Internal 
dissatisfaction with budget preparation initially focused on institutional issues, which delayed 
the adoption of technical changes, such as a proposal to move the budget office from the 
MOF to the President’s Office. The proposal was later rejected but only after the 
appointment of a reform-minded finance minister and director of the Budget Office. FAD is 
currently assisting the authorities to strengthen the Budget Office. Greater impact has been 
observed on the budget execution side, in particular on the closure of annual accounts, 
improving expenditure reporting, and establishing the groundwork for computerization. This 
reflects personnel changes that have led to more openness to reform. However, even here, 
progress remains slow, with generally weak commitment at lower management levels. 
 
In Rwanda, FAD has provided substantial PEM TA in recent years. This has included almost 
three years of resident advice supplemented with a large input from headquarters. The 
coverage of the TA has been broad based, covering budget preparation, budget classification, 
and budget execution; cash planning and management; fiscal reporting, including flash 
reporting; drafting of the organic budget law; and financial instructions. Many other TA 
providers were active in the area during this period, most notably the DFID, the European 
Union (EU), the United National Development Programme (UNDP), and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB).  
 
The devastating events of 1994 profoundly affected the workings of government. Despite 
this, Rwanda now has, by African standards, a relatively well-functioning PEM system. Its 
centralized computerized budget system provides relatively sound expenditure control and 
fiscal reporting. However, the system still relies on advisors and consultants, with local 
management and administrative capacity remaining weak. The overall impact of FAD’s input   - 36 - 
 
has been small. This is largely owing to the wide-ranging nature of FAD’s work, which was 
dwarfed by the input of others in the overall TA picture.  
 
In Tanzania, FAD TA in the PEM area has moved from a wide-ranging diagnostic approach 
to a focus on strengthening budget execution processes. The most intensive period, in the 
late 1990s, featured a resident advisor with a TOR that focused on the most pressing issues in 
this area: the prevention of expenditure arrears, the absence of recording and monitoring of 
expenditure commitments, and weaknesses in cash management. However, with the 
development of an IFMIS, supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA), many of these tasks were viewed as redundant, and the focus of the 
advisor’s work became the introduction of a GFS-based classification system to be integrated 
with the IFMIS. Input was also provided on the legal framework. Through a multi donor 
project, FAD has also supported a macro-fiscal advisor in the MOF. This work, although not 
strictly regarded as PEM, has obvious implications for the quality of budget preparation. 
 
Overall, progress in Tanzania has been encouraging. Reforms in the classification system 
have been well integrated with the IFMIS project and have facilitated revised methods of 
budget preparation and accounting. The IFMIS has yielded benefits, in terms of expenditure 
control and fiscal reporting, although more progress remains to be made in this area. 
Tanzania now has one of the best performing PEM systems in sub-Saharan Africa.
13 FAD 
TA had only a limited role in the overall reform program, primarily owing to the large-scale 
TA effort from other providers. The most important factor in this success has been a strong 
and unified commitment from the leadership and senior management of the MOF that has 
maintained firm control of its reform program and associated TA. 
 
Since 1998, Uganda has received substantial TA through missions, as well as resident 
advisors. FAD’s TA has covered two key areas: (i) expenditure control at the central 
government level; and (ii) budget formulation and fiscal reporting system at the local 
government level. Budget execution at the central government level has been considerably 
strengthened by the implementation of a commitment control system (CCS) for nonwage 
recurrent expenditure and development expenditure, supported by quarterly expenditure 
ceilings fully backed by monthly cash releases. In addition, the modalities for the 
comprehensive audit of the accumulated arrears by the AG have been refined and a database 
for the tracking of arrears established. At the local government level, the most significant 
reform has been in budget preparation, supported by a macroeconomic framework and a 
medium-term plan for the district budgets.  
 
Overall progress in Uganda has been very encouraging. At the end of the first year of the 
implementation of the commitment control reforms, new nonwage arrears were reduced by 
nearly 70 percent compared with the previous financial year; and it appears these gains have 
been maintained. However, there are a few areas of concern: some powerful ministries 
continue to have a tendency to overcommit, and the timeliness and accuracy of data need to 
                                                 
13 Tanzania got one of the best ratings in the Assessment and Action Plan (AAP) exercise.   - 37 - 
 
be improved. FAD’s TA at the local government level had limited success, and some of the 
tasks in the TOR of the resident advisor could not be accomplished, partly due to limited 
capacity in the MOF. The most important influence for the success of FAD’s TA has been 
the strong and unified commitment of the leadership and senior management of the MOF to 
the PEM reforms.  
 
Zambia has been one of the most intensive users of FAD TA over the period. Input began 
with a mission in 1995; resident advice has been almost constant since late 1997. Throughout 
the period, TA was narrowly directed to the needs of the Fund’s lending program. It focused 
on expenditure control and fiscal reporting and, specifically, on the introduction of a system 
of commitment control to try to bring the endemic arrears problem under control. TA 
missions, also frequent over the period, recognized that this problem extends beyond the 
budget execution system and made recommendations covering a wide range of PEM issues. 
However, FAD’s focus has remained squarely on the budget execution system. Other donors 
have also been active in this and other areas. In particular, the World Bank has a large 
TA program, including the development of an IFMIS and an MTEF. 
 
Despite the intensive TA effort, progress up to mid-2002 in Zambia had been extremely 
disappointing. Only a few of the recommendations made by FAD were implemented by the 
authorities, and some of those reforms could not be sustained. The entire period was 
characterized by expenditure overruns, the continuing accumulation of unpaid bills, and the 
nonavailability of reliable and timely expenditure data for budget planning and execution. 
Since mid-2002, there have been some tentative signs of improvement in the areas of 
commitment control, arrears, expenditure tracking, and reporting that FAD TA has continued 
to address, although many issues remain unresolved. Despite the lack of unambiguous 
success, FAD has been under pressure to maintain TA, both to support the often struggling 
Fund programs, and in response to changes of government and personnel that were thought 
to herald a change in reform direction. 
 
Summary of country experiences 
 
This review indicates that the overall impact of Fund TA in the PEM area has been quite 
mixed. Two countries showed clear signs of success while two were distinct failures. There 
have also been some disappointing reversals in the reform process. On the other hand, 
improvements have occurred in some places after prolonged periods of decline.
14 In 
reviewing country case studies, it is apparent that the wider political and economic 
environment is a critical factor influencing PEM reforms. Quite simply, good advice is not 
always acted on. It is worth underscoring that in many ways, and perhaps not surprisingly, 
FAD’s experience mirrors the mixed success of Fund programs in these countries.  
                                                 
14 For example, Ghana’s PEM systems have begun to improve significantly in recent years.   - 38 - 
 
C.   FAD’s Revealed Technical Assistance Priorities 
From this overview, FAD’s TA priorities in the PEM area can be summarized: 
 
•  First, on budget execution issues (the focus of Fund programs); 
•  Second, on budget preparation (largely shared with the World Bank); and 
•  Third, to promote compliance with budget regulations (mainly left to others). 
Budget execution issues: focus of Fund programs 
 
Of the countries in this sample, some have had Fund-supported programs during the study 
period. Not unexpectedly, in countries that have been heavy users of Fund resources, 
FAD’s TA has been substantially influenced by budget execution issues, which are main 
concerns in the implementation of Fund programs.
15 This has caused FAD’s TA to focus on 
issues that were essential for successful program implementation—primarily, expenditure 
control issues and improved fiscal reporting. Thus, in the sample countries, the main areas 
addressed by TA were expenditure control (seven countries), payment process 
(eight countries), and government banking arrangements (seven countries).  
 
Improving expenditure control and fiscal reporting 
 
FAD’s approach to expenditure control has focused on moving away from cash controls 
alone to the first stage of the spending process—controlling commitments to bring them in 
line with cash availability in order to prevent expenditure control problems such as arrears.
16 
In three of the sample countries, FAD’s resident expert had, as a central component of his 
TOR, the task of setting up a CCS.  
 
Another aspect of FAD’s TA advice was to improve cash management concurrently with 
reforming banking arrangements focused on a TSA, to optimize the use of government cash. 
In some cases, it was recognized that this also involved debt management to be integrated 
with the cash planning. In six countries in this sample, FAD’s resident advisors had cash 
management issues among the stated tasks of their TOR. 
 
The need for better quality and timelier fiscal reporting in Fund programs led to a major 
effort in trying to improve the accounting systems that provided the raw data for fiscal 
reports. Attempts to improve accounting were often associated with longer-term projects to 
introduce IFMISs.  
                                                 
15 For a more detailed discussion of PEM measures in Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)–
supported programs, see Gupta, et al. (2002); for an overview of some PEM implications of structural 
adjustment, see Diamond (1996). 
 
16 Increasingly, this approach has been shared with the World Bank and other TA providers.   - 39 - 
 
Despite FAD’s TA, the persistent poor quality of the data has made fiscal reporting difficult. 
The HIPC initiative, which required many of these sample countries (Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia) to report on their 
poverty-related expenditures, exposed the basic weaknesses. Indeed, of the eight HIPC 
countries in the review group, only half passed the average benchmark in fiscal reporting. In 
part, the problem was an inadequate classification system to identify and tag poverty-related 
expenditures, but in part there has been a failure of the system to report in an accurate and 
timely manner. In response, the authorities were encouraged to develop action plans to 
overcome PEM weaknesses, in coordination with TA from donors. FAD, in collaboration 
with the World Bank, carried out an assessment of 24 HIPC countries to identify major PEM 
weakness, helped the authorities develop action plans to address these weaknesses, and also 
provided TA to implement these action plans. Thus, HIPC-related reporting on poverty-
related expenditures formed part of the work program for FAD’s resident advisors in all eight 
HIPC countries included in this sample. 
 
Budget preparation issues: largely shared with the World Bank 
 
The principal issues that FAD’s TA addressed in this area were, in order of priority, 
improved classifications; greater realism in budget projections; ending dual budgeting by 
consolidating recurrent and development budgets; extending budget coverage; supporting 
development of an MTEF; and reviewing budget procedures, most particularly, introducing 
more realistic budget calendars.  
 
In four countries (Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tanzania), FAD’s advisors addressed issues 
related to the budget consolidation and coordination of recurrent and development budgets. 
In three countries (The Gambia, Malawi, and Tanzania), budget classification was the main 
area of FAD’s TA. In Rwanda, FAD assisted in improving budgeting procedures and budget 
preparation timetables, and, finally, in Tanzania FAD helped in extending the budget’s 
coverage. 
 
Issues not substantially addressed by FAD TA  
 
There were a number of areas in PEM that were largely left to other providers, but where 
FAD felt obliged to enter if no other donor was available. One area was in strengthening 
existing financial regulations or drafting new budget management laws and regulations. 
Another area that preoccupied many Anglophone African countries during the period 
examined was the policy to decentralize and the implications of this policy for PEM. 
Missions to Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda examined this issue. FAD’s approach has been 
to treat this topic as benefiting from a multidisciplinary approach, arising from its revenue as 
well as expenditure dimensions. For this reason, it has not been a central element of 
PEM TA.  
 
Also, increasingly, attention has been paid to supporting public commitments to 
transparency, and by so doing improving accountability and countering corruption. Much of 
this effort took place through missions that prepared a Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC), which in the African context had a strong component of   - 40 - 
 
indirect TA. Out of the sample countries, only Malawi and Tanzania received ROSC 
missions, and their reports have been published. Occasionally, FAD provided one-off 
missions to assist functions such as internal audit (Kenya), but these were regarded as 
noncore TA areas by FAD. Other areas, such as strengthening the AG’s office, and any form 
of TA with a strong training element, while recognized as important, were largely left to 
others. 
D.   Mode of Technical Assistance Delivery 
Two issues in FAD’s mode of TA delivery in these countries should be noted: first, the heavy 
dependence on longer-term resident advisors; second, its demand-determined orientation.  
 
FAD’s basic approach to TA delivery in this set of countries, based on a comparatively 
heavier weight given to resident advisors, could be questioned. It is sometimes argued that 
rather than investing so many resources in resident advisors, FAD should remain at the 
diagnostic and strategic end of TA, laying out a TA plan for others to fill in behind it.  
Although this approach has been followed successfully in other geographic regions, in 
Anglophone Africa, this approach did not appear appropriate in many of these countries for a 
number of reasons.  
 
First, many of the TA interventions were directed at resolving problems encountered in Fund 
programs, where other providers could not be expected to attach the same level of 
importance as FAD did. Second, in the sample countries, there were many other providers of 
TA in the PEM area (such as the World Bank and the DFID) whose resources were a great 
deal larger than FAD’s input. These agencies had long been in the field in the PEM area, 
typically having regional offices, and already having a well-formulated TA agenda for these 
countries (often directed by TA policy from their headquarters). There was no reason for 
them to recognize FAD as the lead agency in this area and to be prepared to fill in after 
FAD’s strategic assessments. Third, given the administrative capacity in many of these 
countries, it was felt that implementation of FAD’s recommendations would require 
hands-on support by resident advisors, and missions could not be expected to do this basic 
work. Of course, the danger of this approach was that FAD’s resident advisors could quite 
easily become line officers, moving TA downstream. This danger was often confronted, and 
required vigilant backstopping to minimize it. While there is a certain attraction in sticking 
solely to the top strategic end of TA advice, given these basic realities of TA delivery in the 
African context, it is unlikely FAD had much option in choosing this more basic approach to 
TA delivery. Moreover, since these conditions are likely to change only slowly in the near 
future, it is doubtful if this approach can be substantially modified. Issues regarding FAD’s 
comparative advantage in PEM TA, as well as the relationship with other providers and area 
departments, will be discussed more fully below. 
 
Over the period, FAD’s approach to TA delivery has been largely demand-determined, with 
FAD responding to requests from the authorities for advice to meet their PEM requirements. 
Many of these requests were made at the instigation of the area department, so that it was 
possible for FAD to influence the nature of the request. However, the degree of freedom for 
FAD to be proactive has not been great. The result has been that in responding to demands, 
the specific need that was being satisfied did not necessarily fit into any coherent plan for the   - 41 - 
 
development of the country’s PEM system. Moreover, there is a suspicion that, in this way, 
FAD’s TA tended to be a short-term response to a particular urgent need rather than 
addressing longer-term, and perhaps more fundamental, problems. 
 
It is important to recognize that there was often a tension between short-term and more 
long-term solutions that has been reflected in the mode of delivery. As indicated, FAD TA 
often focused almost exclusively on short-term or interim solutions in the strengthening of 
the present system and purging it of abuses; improving monthly reports (coverage, 
timeliness, quality or reconciliations, etc.); recording, reporting, and monitoring of 
expenditure arrears; and closing annual accounts (catching up with backlogs). The 
longer-term reforms were largely left to others—for example, in developing an integrated 
IFMIS (sometimes FAD assumed some form of support or oversight role, but generally these 
were developed by other donors’ TA). Given the limited absorptive capacity in these 
countries, this meant that there were often tensions between FAD’s TA and the TA of others. 
Throughout the period examined, this raised broader questions of the division of labor in TA 
provision, and of the degree of TA collaboration that was possible in the PEM area.
17  
 
In reviewing the TA provided, the issues that were its focus, and the approach to delivery 
adopted, it is important not to forget that this TA effort represented only a small part of the 
overall TA provided in the PEM area to these countries. FAD’s TA for this group of 
countries during this time period generally took place against a backdrop of increasing TA in 
the PEM area, with a growing number of other TA providers, who often occupied more 
central positions in these countries than did FAD. In Anglophone Africa, this is especially 
true of the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s DFID. Apart from its size, the Fund’s 
short-term approach was often seen as “fire-fighting” rather than capacity building. While it 
was not disputed that FAD focused on areas where the problems were most acute, it is also 
true it often entered these areas only when the problems had already reached intolerable 
levels. For example, in countries like Ghana, FAD clearly intervened with TA after the crisis 
point had been reached. FAD’s TA advice cannot be divorced from this “emergency” aspect 
of FAD’s TA delivery. In Ghana, for example, it is a debatable question whether the 
TA story would have been substantially different if FAD had stayed more engaged over the 
longer term.  
 
                                                 
17 For example see: “The IMF and the World Bank Group: An Enhanced Partnership for Sustainable Growth 
and Poverty Reduction, Joint Statement by Horst Köhler and James Wolfensohn,” September 5, 2000, available 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2000/part.htm; and “Policy Statement on IMF Technical Assistance,” 
April 1, 2001, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/psta/index.htm.   - 42 - 
 
III.   EVALUATION OF PEM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
It is clear, from the above review, that there are some lessons to be learned not only for 
FAD’s future work in the way FAD delivers TA, but also from the experience of different 
countries in the impact this has made as well as the problems that have been encountered. 
A theme emerging from this review is that FAD’s past approach of responding to short-term 
problems in a short-term way, without an overall “game plan” for the country, might not 
have been the most productive approach. Often it appears that, in response to an identified 
problem, FAD offered a set of prescriptions, generally aimed at ameliorating the identified 
problem, but recognizing that a fundamental cure would require substantially more resources, 
especially on the side of the country authorities, and take much more time. Perhaps FAD 
should have stepped back and looked at the nature of the reforms based on a broad strategic 
overview. If this work were to be done now, with hindsight, what would FAD have done that 
was different? Would FAD have chosen to focus on the same problem areas and, if so, 
offered the same prescriptions? Would other areas have perhaps been included that were 
neglected in the past or left to others? Would FAD have attempted to integrate its work better 
with the work of others, or chosen to be more directly involved in some areas? 
 
Squarely addressing these key questions will allow a reshaping of FAD’s overall strategy 
toward this group of countries in the PEM area. This section of the report is thus structured to 
answer these three sets of questions. First is an examination of the priority areas for FAD’s 
past TA, to assess what went wrong as well as what went right. Second is a review of other 
areas that perhaps FAD might have emphasized more. Third is an examination of how FAD 
advice was coordinated with that of other TA providers, and the way that conflicts arose and 
how they might be resolved in the future.  
 
Accordingly, this section analyzes the features of the FAD TA program described at the end 
of Section II to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken. In doing so, it 
addresses, in turn, the individual areas of focus identified in Section II: expenditure and 
commitment control; fiscal reporting; accounting systems and IFMISs; budget preparation 
and MTEFs; issues not substantially addressed by FAD TA; and, finally, in Section IV, 
issues concerning the mode of TA delivery. In each area, the analysis considers the 
appropriateness of the subjects chosen and the solutions recommended, assesses the reasons 
for success or lack of it, and discusses alternative solutions or areas that could have been 
emphasized more. Specific country examples are identified where relevant. The proposals 
made in each section form the basis of the summary future strategy in Section V. 
 
A.   Expenditure and Commitment Control 
Analysis 
Section II identified that, in the latter part of the 1990s, FAD’s TA in the PEM area stressed 
the importance of commitment controls as essential to controlling expenditures (see Box 3). 
Certainly, even in those countries where FAD has provided extensive TA on this issue, one 
can ask why arrears continue to be a major problem. Box 4 provides a more detailed account 
of the problems encountered in implementing commitment controls in one set of countries.   - 43 - 
 
Although this experience may not directly apply to the other countries in the study, it does 
provide an illustration of the wide range of factors that appear to have contributed to the 
disappointing results in this area. These are detailed below. 
 
  Box 3. The Approach to Commitment Controls 
Since all commitments result in future cash payments, control of commitments is essential for 
controlling expenditure. FAD’s TA assisted a number of countries to set up commitment control 
regimes—including Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The key objective of such regimes 
is to require SMs to focus on controlling the initial incurrence of liabilities rather than the subsequent 
cash payments. 
A commitment occurs when a formal action is taken, such as placing an order or awarding a contract that
renders the government liable to pay either immediately or sometime in future. In cases where 
expenditure does not involve a specific contract (e.g., wages, utilities, rent, debt service), but where there 
is an obligation for the government to meet the expenditure, then a reasonable estimate of these 
expenditures must be made and should be treated as commitments.  
Since commitments mature as payments, control of commitments is essential for expenditure control. If 
commitments are not controlled, expenditures or arrears cannot be controlled. The key elements of 
a CCS are: 
•  Each line ministry (LM) sends to the MOF a quarterly expenditure plan supported by projected 
monthly cash requirements. Based on annual and quarterly cash plans, the MOF issues quarterly 
expenditure ceilings along with the projected amounts of monthly cash release to SMs, before the 
beginning of each quarter.  
•  The SM must limit the commitments to the level of quarterly expenditure ceilings and keep 
planned payments within monthly cash release.  
•  A monthly report on outstanding commitments and unpaid bills is prepared and submitted by the 
SMs to the MOF.  
Each LM should have a commitment control officer (CCO), usually the controlling/accounting officer, 
who is responsible for managing the system. Detailed procedures for approval of commitments, 
payment, and accounting are issued. The onus is on the CCO to ensure that commitments entered into 
are consistent with the quarterly ceilings—without incurring any payment arrears. 
 
 
Accounting framework gives low priority to commitment control 
 
In most Anglophone African countries, the requirement to control commitments is reflected 
in the structure of records that should be maintained by budget institutions (typically, in a 
column in a basic “vote book” or “commitment and expenditure ledger”). These ledgers are 
typically manual and are poorly maintained. At the same time, statutory requirements focus 
almost exclusively on controlling expenditures with respect to budget appropriations. 
Accountability to parliament is through annual appropriations that expire at the end of each 
financial year, and financial reports reflect cash execution of the expenditure plan approved 
by parliament. The budget office in the MOF focuses on presenting the next budget, and in 
satisfying government and political pressures for cash. In this way, commitments made and   - 44 - 
 
coming due have taken a distant second place to the immediate cash position, even though 
they can seriously distort that position. 
 
The budget as the basis for commitments is not credible 
 
Budgets have often been based on an incremental approach and unrealistic projections of 
revenues. Typically, expenditures are underestimated or omitted. To this can be added 
contingencies, genuine national emergencies, and inevitable presidential and cabinet office 
extrabudgetary decisions. All this means that the budget loses its credibility as an expenditure 
plan. In turn, politically powerful SMs will accept lower provisions than they believe are 
required because they know that they will be able to recover their position during the year 
through the cash release process and budget supplementaries. In this way, the budget does 
not have credibility and, without this, can provide no basis for disciplined implementation.  
 
Authority to spend is not fully backed by cash 
 
Many Anglophone African countries use a warrant system for authorizing spending, to allow 
tranches of the budget to be released throughout the year. Cash releases are often below 
warrant levels, and the latter are also often below budget authorizations. Thus, if SMs base 
their commitments on budget authorizations, arrears are inevitable. This explains why, for 
many of these countries, budget execution has been driven by a cash-rationing system that is 
used to reconcile internal inconsistencies in the approved budget, as well as to meet new 
(unbudgeted) expenditures arising during the year. Decisions on cash releases are typically 
made by a small group in the MOF in a nontransparent way. This can generate widespread 
mistrust in SMs and promote the idea of a lack of discipline in the MOF. Cash releases are 
suspected of being driven by decisions made for political and other reasons unconnected to 
the budget. Generally, it is very disruptive to orderly operations of government—some weak 
SMs are deprived of cash for regular recurrent expenditures, and cash releases for capital 
expenditures are even more sporadic, usually receiving the lowest priority. 
 
This system allows SMs to deny their accountability under the claim that their arrears are not 
their fault, nor do they arise from their lack of effort to control commitments—the arrears are 
simply caused by the MOF’s cash releases not matching budget provisions. 
 
Cash management is poor 
 
FAD’s TA did address cash management as a separate but related aspect of commitment 
control in some, but not in all, countries. The need to pursue this issue was clear, although 
recognized as difficult. For those countries that followed a decentralized system that is 
associated with multiple bank accounts, the desired consolidation of these bank accounts 
inevitably ran against current accepted practices, and hence encountered more than the usual 
opposition from SMs. In some of these countries, the move to a TSA was constrained by the 
banking system. In the absence of adequate electronic networks in the banking system, the 
consolidation of accounts was difficult, and the use of zero-balance accounts in the 
commercial banks that could be swept by the MOF was impossible. At the same time, 
because of the lack of any tradition of centralized cash management, cash-planning skills   - 45 - 
 
remained at a basic level in the MOF, and the importance of the TSA for financial planning 
was not fully appreciated by top management.  
 
Corruption is a factor 
 
When someone controls cash releases in a nontransparent way, opportunities for diversion 
into activity not approved by the budget are encouraged. This diversion, by reducing the 
funds available for legitimate requirements, contributes to arrears. It also encourages SMs to 
view arrears as an option for funding legitimate activities. The problem tends to be 
exacerbated by weak internal controls: for example, internal audit is geared to a retrospective 
approach and it is typically underfunded. Successful prosecution of fraud is low, and there 
are inadequate accounting and purchasing controls. In addition, the problem is almost 
legitimized by the inadequacy of civil servant remuneration.   - 46 - 
 
  Box 4. The Commitment Control Systems in Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia 
In the mid-1990s, the PEM system in Uganda was characterized by (i) expenditure overruns, particularly in 
the nonwage recurrent budget; (ii) lack of an adequate system to monitor and control commitments; and 
(iii) accumulation of expenditure arrears by the central spending agencies. In 1997, the government of 
Uganda requested FAD’s TA on expenditure control and monitoring. FAD started providing TA through a 
resident advisor, beginning in November 1998.  
FAD TA to the government of Uganda consisted of (i) designing and implementing a CCS for controlling 
commitments; (ii) closely monitoring commitments and expenditures, and avoiding the buildup of new 
arrears; (iii) verifying the accumulated stock of arrears by the AG; and (iv) training and capacity building to 
ensure sustainability of these reforms. The approach to the CCS is described in Box 3. 
The package of measures included (i) implementing the CCS for nonwage recurrent expenditures for all 
central ministries and departments in July 1999; (ii) introducing the CCS for development expenditure 
effective October 2000; (iii) maintaining quarterly expenditure ceilings fully backed by monthly cash 
releases, based on improved cash management; (iv) providing adequate funds for priority and essential 
budget items and more realistic budget estimates; (v) creating public awareness through the media about the 
CCS and the responsibility of accounting officers to pay bills within 30 days; (vi) strengthening internal audit 
and inspection to enforce compliance and improve the quality of commitment data; and 
(vii) comprehensively auditing the stock of arrears by the AG and implementing a strategy for their 
liquidation.  
At the end of the first year of the implementation of the above measures, new nonwage arrears were reduced 
by nearly 70 percent compared with the previous financial year; and in the subsequent years the gains were 
maintained. However, there were a few areas of concern: some power ministries had a tendency to 
overcommit and accumulate unpaid bills, and the timeliness and accuracy of data needed to be enhanced. The 
system needs to be consolidated and strengthened further to ensure its long-term sustainability. The most 
important reason for the success has been the very strong and unified commitment of the leadership and 
senior management of the MOF to the commitment control reforms.  
Compared with Uganda, there were considerable difficulties in implementing a CCS in Zambia and Malawi. 
In Zambia, the CCS did not prove to be effective as it was difficult to get beyond the recording and 
monitoring of outstanding commitments and unpaid bills, which were needed to control commitments; and it 
was not combined with other supporting measures as in Uganda. The latter country introduced a system of 
quarterly expenditure ceilings fully backed by monthly cash releases, along with an inspection process to 
enforce compliance and improve the quality of commitment data. This limited approach in Zambia was a 
symptom of an MOF that was unable or unwilling to impose financial discipline. 
In Malawi, the CCS introduced was very similar to the one in Uganda. Despite some initial progress in 
recording and reporting expenditure commitments and audit of arrears, there was no impact on the 
accumulation of new arrears. The system has not progressed further due to noncompliance by the spending 
agencies and lack of enforcement and penalties by the MOF. Political neglect and lack of institutional 
capacity have also undermined reform efforts. 
 
 
Separating stock and flow solutions to arrears is impossible 
 
The above features undermine the usual approach to arrears. Typically, the recommended 
solution to arrears problems is to tighten controls to prevent new arrears while paying off the 
old stock. However, special budget provisions for paying off existing arrears usually assume 
that no new arrears are created. Unfortunately, these special provisions may create moral 
hazard, encouraging SMs—whether suffering cash shortages or not—to use the special   - 47 - 
 
“arrears” releases to meet ongoing and new commitments. The existence of such provisions 
is simply an incentive to create new arrears in order to acquire cash that is not otherwise 
provided. 
 
Sanctions for noncompliance are absent 
 
Often, there is an absence of sanctions against ministers, AOs, or chief accountants who 
consistently ignore the requirements placed on them by the MOF to control commitments 
and eliminate arrears, even though they exist in financial regulations. This is partly a result of 
the power structure in ministries. Often, the MOF does not have sufficient power to confront 
other SMs and, if it does so, would risk being thrown into conflict with the president, who 
appoints ministers and AOs. However, the problem is typically more basic than this—a lack 
of enforced financial discipline throughout government. In the decentralized Anglophone 
environment, change can come about only by forcing AOs to be fully accountable for the 
funds they manage—not only actual payments made but also all arrears accumulated. 
 
Leadership and management shortfalls hinder success 
 
A number of other factors work against successful reform. First, a typical state of perpetual 
crisis exists so that few reforms are properly managed and even fewer are implemented 
through to their conclusion. Crisis management and damage control overtake good budget 
management. Second, inadequate management skills and reluctance to delegate authority 
impede or delay decision making. Third, poor basic wages are out of proportion with 
allowances that have arisen to compensate for poor pay. The reward system is skewed toward 
attending workshops and seminars, and obtaining status symbols, such as cars and mobile 
phones, rather than being based on achievement. Fourth, job insecurity and reliance on 
patronage and political and other connections, together with large extended families, make it 
difficult for individuals to resist pressure from above or to make hard decisions. Not 
surprisingly, directives, guidelines on processes, and procedures are often overlooked, 
overridden, or ignored.  
 
Future options 
 
The factors described above strike at the heart of PEM problems in Anglophone African 
countries. They suggest that commitment control efforts might have been better applied at the 
root cause of the problem. Moreover, in practice, commitment controls often cover only a 
small part of the budget. Important components such as wages, interest, and even spending 
on utilities have been excluded as “fixed” commitments. It is apparent that, for commitment 
control to be effective, it cannot simply be considered a technical problem, but requires the 
active backing of the authorities at the highest level. Often this appeared lacking and 
undermined the successful application of FAD’s TA in this area. Even when this backing was 
present, the technical problems appeared quite fundamental. Any proposed solution 
confronted the basic endemic problem of poor record keeping and data quality in these 
countries (see Section B below). Without the basic records being adequately maintained 
within the SMs, the task of introducing commitment reporting and controls was problematic. 
Also, to move from commitment recording and reporting to commitment control, although   - 48 - 
 
possible manually (e.g., in Uganda), ideally requires computerization, which has proved 
difficult to introduce in the African context (also discussed below). 
 
Given this general environment, what should FAD’s approach be? 
 
Before advancing on establishing a CCS, a review of four main aspects of the expenditure 
control problem should be undertaken. 
 
•  First, an assessment should be made of the realism of budget estimates on which 
commitments will be based and, if they are not credible, FAD should refrain from 
emphasizing a CCS as a solution. Rather, the focus should be on improved budget 
preparation. 
•  Second, an assessment should be made of the quality of the cash planning that 
underlies the cash release system. If deficient, it should be strengthened before a CCS 
is put in place. 
•  Third, an assessment should be made of whether it is possible to identify and monitor 
the present stock of arrears, and to develop reporting mechanisms that will capture the 
incurrence of new arrears.  
•  Fourth, there should be adequate assurances of political commitment to enforce 
accountability, so that if AOs are discovered to be deficient in their responsibilities 
they will be sanctioned. 
All of these requirements should be viewed as components of an effective CCS. If deficient, 
these aspects should be strengthened simultaneously, or even viewed as preconditions, for the 
introduction of a CCS. 
 
B.   Fiscal Reporting 
Analysis  
 
As indicated from the above review of FAD’s TA inputs, much of the work has focused on 
improving fiscal data and its reporting. The experience of the countries reviewed in this study 
would suggest that perhaps the problems in this area have tended to be underestimated.  
 
The disappointing record in this area largely reflects the fact that poor fiscal reporting stems 
from weaknesses throughout the PEM system (see Box 5). This diffusion of contributing 
factors is difficult to address when central reporting of different stages of the expenditure 
process requires inputs from many units. Inevitably, there has been a relative paucity of 
resources directed to this underlying problem. The responsibility for delivering any reform 
has to be the SM’s—and, in the past, a sufficient volume of TA resources was not directed 
there. In many cases, FAD’s TA was applied to improving procedures in the OAG. However, 
at this central level, the focus was mainly on the last stage of spending—cash transactions   - 49 - 
 
and their reconciliation with bank accounts. A single FAD TA advisor placed at the center, in 
the MOF, could not be considered as adequate to address this problem.  
 
  Box 5. Sources of Poor Data Quality and Fiscal Reporting 
•  Incomplete coverage  
- Extrabudgetary funds. 
- Lower levels of government. 
- Information on donor-funded projects. 
•  Cash reporting 
- Hence no expenditure and taxation arrears data. 
- Other noncash fiscal impacts absent. 
•  Gaps in important fiscal information 
- Government guarantees. 
- Quasi-fiscal activities. 
- Contingent liabilities. 
•  Data inconsistencies 
- Coverage of government accounts in monetary survey not the same as above-the-line fiscal data. 
- No reconciliation of debt stocks with financing flows. 
- No reconciliation of accounting ledger data with bank account records, undermining reliability. 
- Budget and outturn data are very different because of poor revenue forecasting techniques, 
  weak expenditure controls, and poor cost estimation. 
- Fiscal programs not the same as represented by budget approved by parliament. 
•  Lags in reporting 
- In-year reports slow or incomplete. 
- End-year accounts and audited accounts delayed. 
________________________________________ 
Source: Craig (2002). 
 
 
Unfortunately, often other donors have not seen the value in applying resources at this stage 
of the spending cycle. Inputs provided by other donors tend to be aimed mostly at more 
“upstream,” and probably less resource-intensive, reforms in budget preparation 
(see Malawi). A major effort is required to promote greater donor participation in building up 
capacity in the SMs to strengthen data recording and reporting and in establishing solid 
internal management controls. The focus of FAD’s TA in fiscal reporting, and some 
examples of its application, is reviewed in Box 6. 
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  Box 6. The Focus on Fiscal Reporting 
The fiscal reporting system in most of the sample countries is inadequate and weak. The sources of 
available data are quite scattered and are not easily integrated. The large discrepancies in fiscal data 
negatively impact Fund program design, implementation, and monitoring. 
The budgeting and accounting systems do not provide (i) information on costs of policies and programs 
for planning and budgeting; (ii) financial information for budget management; and (iii) reliable data on 
revenue, expenditures, and financing for monitoring economic performance. The banking information in 
the revenue and expenditure bank accounts is mainly used for monitoring program targets. The fiscal 
situation is derived from the books of the central bank. 
There are serious concerns about the quality and consistency of the fiscal data, which result in a sizable 
discrepancy between the above- and below-the-line data. It becomes very difficult to assess and monitor 
fiscal deficit. Another major factor contributing to this problem is that government policymakers and 
financial managers at various levels do not seem to be interested in using fiscal data for monitoring, 
controlling, and decision making. The dissemination of fiscal data to the legislature and the public is 
very limited. Often, fiscal reports are produced to meet requirements of international organizations and 
bilateral donors rather than as a key tool to set fiscal policy and monitor fiscal targets. 
Much of FAD’s TA input has been directed toward improving the availability and quality of fiscal data. 
FAD’s recent TA in The Gambia has helped in the closure of past annual accounts, the recording of loan 
and grant transactions, and the development of a flash reporting system in the absence of a timely 
general ledger in the Accountant General Department. In Nigeria, FAD’s TA has assisted in developing 
interim software applications for recording the warrants, cash releases, and maintenance of the cash 
book; this has improved the monitoring of budget implementation. FAD’s TA in Malawi also worked on 
improving the consistency and quality of the various sources of fiscal data. 
The impact of FAD’s TA on improving fiscal reporting has been inevitably limited in the countries 
reviewed. FAD’s TA has focused on interim solutions to address the immediate problems in fiscal 
reporting; the ultimate solution lies in establishing IFMISs, which is largely being addressed by the 
World Bank. 
 
 
Responding to fiscal reporting needs from a short-term perspective 
  
The question has been raised that by concentrating on data quality and fiscal reporting FAD 
may have adopted a short-sighted “Band-Aid” approach to this problem. Could we have 
taken a more structural approach that would have yielded more sustained improvements?  
 
Future options 
 
If we examine the usual problems confronted in the African context when attempting to 
improve fiscal reporting, their causes are so diverse that they cover almost all PEM areas. It 
could be argued that any effective solution to data reporting problems must be sought in 
addressing the fundamentals, not the symptoms. This could be viewed as a medium- to 
long-term solution running counter to the Fund’s short-term data requirements and program 
orientation. At the same time, the short-term need of the area department for reasonably 
reliable data cannot be ignored. What is the basic minimum interim solution to a   - 51 - 
 
country’s data problems that must be established before addressing required 
longer-term reforms? 
 
First, support should be provided to the area department in ensuring that the coverage of 
fiscal reports meets the requirements of the Fund’s program. In terms of HIPC countries, this 
means the ability to track poverty-related spending, even if it takes place at lower levels of 
government. 
 
Second, assistance should be provided in setting up reporting mechanisms for tracking the 
level of arrears, and subsidiary procedures are needed to allow an audit of at least the most 
substantial of these arrears. Given their interrelation, care should be taken to include both 
expenditure and tax arrears.  
 
Third, some benchmark procedures should be put in place to assure some basic minimum 
level in the data quality reached. This will involve procedures for 
 
•  Checking that the government bank accounts included in the fiscal reports match 
those for the government sector in the monetary survey. 
•  Closing all below-the-line accounts used for evading financial controls. 
•  Reconciling changes in debt stocks with financing flows. 
•  Reconciling accounting ledger data with bank account records. 
In addressing weaknesses in the accounting system that underlies the fiscal reporting system, 
there are two particular areas that should be focused on: 
 
Stress the importance of the accounting function. An essential element in good reporting 
is timely record keeping and accounting in the SMs and the OAG. Clearly, government 
accounting has been an important focus of FAD TA. Even so, perhaps FAD could play a 
more proactive role in stressing to MOF managers the importance of the accounting function. 
The aim should be to counter the tendency often found in the Anglophone African system for 
the OAG to be the “poor relative” of the MOF’s top management, or else divorced from 
direct MOF involvement. 
 
Stress the timelier closing of accounts. The weakness of the accounting function has been 
manifested in many Anglophone African countries by the failure to close government 
accounts in a timely fashion after the fiscal year ends. This is a widespread problem in 
Africa, and has led FAD to provide recent technical support to complete this task 
(e.g., in The Gambia and Lesotho). This approach could be regarded as too downstream, yet 
at the same time, it addresses area department program needs. Given the importance of 
closing accounts to ensure the quality and timeliness of fiscal data, perhaps FAD should 
develop a general position on how to treat lack of production of historical accounts. This 
would involve a twofold approach: an immediate injection of TA to help close the accounts,   - 52 - 
 
and a strategy to strengthen the OAGs to prevent a recurrence of the problem—that is, 
a combination of downstream and upstream technical advice. 
 
C.   Accounting Systems and IFMISs 
FAD’s advice on accounting systems tended to focus on the immediate problem of rectifying 
weaknesses in the presently functioning accounting systems. This largely stemmed from 
FAD’s focus on improving fiscal data in the short term (see Section B above). From this 
perspective, two problems were often encountered: local capacity constraints and the need to 
accommodate medium-term computerized solutions. 
 
Even in improving basic manual accounting systems, the limited capacity of the OAGs in 
these countries constrained the progress that was possible. Almost universally, FAD’s TA 
efforts have come face-to-face with a basic constraint in the African context: a general 
shortage of accounting skills. Moreover, efforts to improve these skills in government have 
often been frustrated by the migration of skilled labor to the private sector for higher pay—
another endemic problem of the government sector in most of these countries.  
 
At the same time, FAD advisors have often been assigned to countries that are undertaking 
large donor-supported computerized projects, such as IFMISs, and find themselves unable to 
avoid being drawn into supporting these projects. When FAD’s TA has been used to support 
IFMIS development—not just in Africa—the experience has not generally been good. All 
these projects have taken considerably more time and resources than initial project estimates. 
Many have tended to be a time-consuming distraction for FAD’s advisors, although 
peripheral to their TOR (see Box 7). 
 
However, the fact remains that there are very few successful projects to be shown for all the 
TA effort and financial resources that have been applied by other donors in this PEM area. 
There are a number of reasons for this, many of which are common to implementing large 
projects in other areas.  
 
Computerization cannot be the solution if fundamental preconditions are lacking 
 
Since the accounting system is the backbone of the IFMIS, to successfully develop an IFMIS, 
accounting procedures must be adequate. Often, there is a low level of computer literacy in 
the country, which must first be built up before such projects are truly viable, especially 
when applied government-wide. A computerized system’s greater reliance on 
communications systems, which are admittedly poor in Africa, may be another constraint. 
Also, the Anglophone system may be at a disadvantage in this regard, since it is more 
difficult to computerize a system that has spread between OAGs and SMs. Thus, while 
IFMISs may be the medium-term solution to many PEM problems, it is most important to be 
realistic about the time horizon in which they can be implemented.  
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  Box 7. Implementation of IFMISs 
In the early 1990s, developing countries in Africa began focusing on budget and expenditure management 
reforms. A new element was added to the PEM reform agenda—the introduction of an IFMIS to improve 
the quality of public finance, particularly budgeting, accounting, and fiscal reporting. Among various 
African countries involved in the process of developing and implementing an IFMIS, Tanzania is well 
advanced and has successfully implemented a core budgeting and accounting system in central ministries 
and departments. Many other countries under review, notably, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and 
Uganda, are still struggling to get their IFMISs up and running. 
Ghana has been implementing an ambitious multifaceted Public Financial Management Reform Program 
(PUFMARP) since 1996. The development of the IFMIS (referred to as the Budget and Public Expenditure 
Management System, or BPEMS, in Ghana) is ongoing, and the pilot implementation started in 
January 2003. Similarly, Malawi initiated budget reforms in 1995 with an MTEF and an IFMIS; the IFMIS 
is still under pilot implementation at four selected sites. Uganda and Kenya are still in the process of 
procuring the hardware and software for their IFMISs. The IFMIS project in The Gambia has not even 
entered the design phase after more than two years of “development” work. 
The track record of financial management reform programs, including the introduction of an IFMIS, has 
been rather disappointing. These reform programs were basically donor-driven, with limited commitment 
and involvement of the political directorate and local officials. The development of the IFMIS, which has 
been a component of overly ambitious and complex reform projects with a broad range of interrelated 
interventions in budget preparation and execution, has encountered design and implementation problems, 
which resulted in substantial delays. The necessary capacity to manage and implement IFMISs has not been 
adequate. The management capacities for this major change and the development of a conducive 
environment to digest the reforms have been missing. 
The substantial delays in the introduction of IFMISs have raised other problems. In Ghana, the MTEF took 
off as planned, and a new budget classification was introduced, for which the IFMIS (BPEMS) was not 
ready to record expenditure transactions; as a result, there were no accounts for almost two years, and the 
government had to develop an interim system to record transactions to conform to the new budget 
classification. This has raised the issue of the interdependency of project components and subcomponents; in 
a system, implementation problems in one area impact other related project areas. 
As indicated, FAD advisors have been assigned to countries that are undertaking large donor-supported 
IFMIS projects, and often find they are drawn into supporting these projects. In Malawi, the slow 
implementation of the IFMIS project has been a recurrent problem throughout the stay of FAD’s resident 
advisors. In the interim period of four to five years prior to the full implementation of IFMIS, FAD has tried 
to ensure that the present accounting and reporting systems are maintained, and that business practices in the 
MOF are adjusted to the new computerized environment.  
 
 
 
Leadership of politicians and top bureaucrats is weak 
 
To get IFMIS reforms accepted, decision makers must be sold the idea that the benefits 
exceed risk. However, officials tend to be risk averse—introducing computer technology is 
an innovation that is perceived as risky. It is complex, it demands skilled staff, and it needs 
procedural changes. There is plenty of evidence of past failure. At the same time, 
decision makers often lack the necessary background: the information technology (IT) is 
usually introduced by expatriates, so there is room for distrust, even hostility. Second, 
decision makers must be convinced it is needed—that is, that the problem exists and,  - 54 - 
 
therefore, is in need of reform. Basing a reform on conditions imposed by donors, as has 
sometimes been the case in Africa, does not increase the success rate. Third, decision makers 
should recognize the urgency of the reform or the need for prompt implementation—often 
this perception is lacking at the top. 
 
Institutional constraints must be overcome 
The introduction of an IFMIS is not just a technical effort; it is a change in the traditional 
way of “doing business.” Hence, the reform of business practices should be a top priority, but 
too often there exists a blind belief that computers will solve all problems. For an IFMIS 
project to succeed, substantial groundwork is needed to standardize and modify the manual 
procedures, including documentation used and procedural rules across all ministries, and 
redesignation and strengthening of internal controls, to provide the basis for an enduring 
system design. As a result, while computerization significantly improves data processing, the 
greatest benefit may simply be in improving the manual system. The introduction of 
computers and the discipline of data processing tend to highlight the incompleteness of a 
manual system. Accordingly, it makes sense to first strengthen the manual accounting 
system, with minimal electronic data processing. A robust manual system promotes a robust 
computerized system by providing an accurate paper trail that encourages accountability.  
 
Project management and coordination mechanisms must be strengthened 
 
In the African context, available information is often inadequate as a basis for sound IFMIS 
project decisions. A leading cause of this inadequacy is more fundamental: the lack of 
capacity within implementing agencies. Senior staff in bureaucracies of African countries 
rarely delegate responsibility and frequently are overloaded with work. They lack the time 
and resources to lead reform even if they accept the need. To be successful, the IFMIS should 
not place extensive demands on the overburdened senior staff. Often, in the past, this has not 
been the case. While there is no doubt that the MOF should take a lead as the central agency, 
other ministries should also be given the opportunity for full participation in system 
development.  
 
Often it is not sufficiently recognized that adequate training efforts are necessary to gain the 
SM finance managers’ acceptance of the reforms. In Anglophone Africa, an added problem 
has been that such IFMIS projects have been centered in OAGs, which, as previously 
indicated, are often a little disconnected from other MOF departments (see Section I).  
 
Time frames adopted need to be feasible and realistic 
 
In the past, there has been a tendency to tell those in top management what they want to hear. 
This is reinforced by their short political time horizon when judging reform payoffs. The 
time and cost estimates for all types of computer system development and installation have 
almost universally been understated, partly due to the red tape of development agency 
bureaucracies, coupled with delays inherent in the implementation of IT systems. Moreover, 
the latter is magnified by the human resource shortages faced by these countries, so that it 
will take them much longer to introduce IT systems than in more advanced countries—
experience suggests perhaps two to three times as long.  - 55 - 
 
Ensure IFMIS projects involve users 
 
Owing to the lack of local IT expertise, there has been a tendency to leave system 
development to private consultants or the computer supplier, with little user involvement. 
Hence, no user expertise is developed in utilizing, maintaining, or modifying the system. 
Often this is reinforced by inappropriate or nonexistent user manuals, and typically not 
enough emphasis has been placed on documentation, nor on training based on that 
documentation. 
 
More time should be spent on the design phase 
 
The functional requirements document that serves as the blueprint for later phases of the 
system project is critical—if wrong, it is difficult to remedy the situation later. Requirements 
analysis is important but tends to be an often neglected step. It also takes time: a detailed 
analysis can take three months to a year for the accounting function alone.  
 
While it is important to appreciate the problems faced in their implementation, it is also 
important to be aware of the dangers IFMIS projects can pose. Concentrating on IT solutions 
may have undermined manual systems (e.g., in The Gambia and Ghana). In Malawi, the slow 
implementation of the IFMIS project was a recurrent issue and problem throughout the stay 
of FAD’s advisors; while in many respects it is a case study in failure, at the same time, it 
absorbed much of authorities’ as well as experts’ efforts. The experience of Malawi is one 
that has been unfolding elsewhere, with FAD’s advisors identifying problems after the fact 
(with consultants’ products, with poor pilots, etc.). In The Gambia, for example, an 
unrealistic delivery date for the IFMIS actually closed down the manual general ledger 
entries. In some cases the need to support such projects has most likely detracted from the 
advisor’s effectiveness in other areas. 
 
Future strategy 
 
Having recognized the magnitude of the problems TA faces in this area, it would also appear 
that FAD has little choice but to be involved in such projects for some time. The IFMISs will 
remain important to a longer-term PEM reform agenda, and FAD should be involved if only 
to avoid the problems that could arise if they are poorly designed and implemented. The 
question concerns the optimal way of getting involved in their development. Most important 
for FAD’s TA is that, even if they are accepted as a longer-term solution, the IFMISs do not 
address the problem of the interim period of, say, four to five years prior to the full 
implementation of the IFMIS. In this period, FAD’s role should be to see that the present 
accounting and reporting systems are maintained, and business practices in the MOF are 
adjusted to function in the new computerized environment, and to ensure that the desired 
functionality of the IFMIS is incorporated in its design.  
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Certainly, given the time frame of such reform, FAD needs to be particularly cautious in the 
commitment of TA in this area. FAD’s role is, therefore, proposed to be along the following 
lines:  
 
•  First, before offering support, a judgment should be made that the preconditions are 
suitable: the commitment of top managers and adequate project management 
capability and coordination mechanisms. 
•  Second, a well-defined exit point should be established. Broadly, there are three 
stages of the IFMIS: design, adoption, and institutionalization. Design involves 
determining the information needs of the client and developing user-friendly software 
that will process the information and produce the necessary reports. At the adoption 
stage, the computerized system operates parallel to manual systems, and it is 
important to ensure that the system performs as expected and any required 
modifications are made. Institutionalization is the point at which the computer system 
is fully combined with government financial operations and is fully managed and 
operated by government staff. It is recommended that FAD participate in only the 
initial design and testing stage. 
•  Third, in that design work FAD should pay attention to key concerns—namely, it 
should ensure that there is a reform of work practices and that the project is not 
simply computerizing the existing procedures; that the accounting core of the IFMIS 
is sound and will generate the information required for MOF management and fiscal 
analysis; that the general functionality requirements are comprehensive enough to 
accommodate not just present but also future needs; and that the timetable for 
implementation is realistic. 
D.   Budget Preparation and the MTEF 
Has the MTEF undermined more basic work in budget preparation? 
 
It seems clear that FAD’s work in the budget preparation area has been dwarfed in the period 
under review by the promotion of the MTEFs by the World Bank (see Table 3). Most of 
FAD’s usual advice in this area has been subsumed into, and overshadowed by, the MTEF 
process. In this process, FAD has made valuable, but limited contributions—for example, in 
budget classification in Malawi and Tanzania, in the reorganization and strengthening of 
functions of the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Kenya, and in the introduction of 
top-down ceilings and more realistic costing of expenditure policies in Uganda. However, for 
FAD’s future work there are some deeper questions regarding the impact of the MTEFs and 
their sustainability. 
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This section analyzes whether MTEFs can be implemented in advance of basic capabilities in 
budget execution, reporting, and cash management. If the answer is negative, the potential 
impact of FAD’s TA in support of MTEFs would be ineffective. The World Bank has been 
promoting MTEFs in most African countries. This has replaced the previous emphasis on 
Public Investment Programs (PIPs), which have fallen from favor in recognition of the 
dangers of separating recurrent and development expenditures in overall expenditure plans. 
The MTEFs have received even more attention in the context of integrating the PRSPs into a 
coherent multiyear public expenditure program. Recently, the value of MTEFs in the African 
context has been questioned, even within the World Bank. It is beginning to be recognized 
that in countries where other key aspects of budget management remain weak, an MTEF 
alone cannot deliver improved PEM. In some country contexts, MTEFs are suspected of 
being counterproductive, diverting attention away from more basic reforms and tying up 
limited administrative capacity. 
 
The key attraction of the MTEF is its approach to integrating the top-down resource envelope 
with bottom-up sector programs (or SEFs). The sector review presupposes either a program-
based budget structure or, at least, detailed functional and organizational budget 
classification systems. Often the functional basis of the budget is not adequate, so that not 
much can be said about intrasectoral resource allocation. Moreover, for most African 
countries, the focus has been exclusively on the central government level, despite an 
increasing trend for fiscal decentralization in the majority of these countries. Sometimes, the 
MTEF exists as a parallel exercise rather than being integrated into the budget process. The 
result is that it is difficult to fully operationalize the theoretical design, or fully implement 
MTEFs, which then consequently remain partial in their approach. Moreover, at best, the 
MTEF represents a reform of budget preparation, or the preparation of the government’s 
socioeconomic plan. However, it could be argued that key issues in African countries revolve 
around budget execution, reporting, and expenditure controls. If isolated from these other 
reforms, the MTEF cannot deliver what it is supposed to deliver and the government’s 
socioeconomic plan cannot be implemented (see Box 8). 
 
Options for FAD’s TA 
 
If it is believed that MTEFs are useful and here to stay, then the question of how they should 
be integrated into the larger PEM reform program should be addressed. If their ultimate 
usefulness is doubted, they will die like the PIPs before them, and FAD should not expend its 
limited resources on them but return to basic budget preparation work. This would help to 
develop macroeconomic policy and analysis capacity; improve budget classification; 
improve the realism of budget estimates, enhancing forecasting capabilities and the systems 
that provide the relevant information within government; and assist in the integration of 
recurrent and development budgets. On balance, the latter approach is favored in this report, 
based on experience regarding the best sequencing of reforms and the presumption that 
MTEFs should be anchored in solid budget preparation techniques. Since the latter are often 
lacking or weak, this report takes the position that the ultimate viability of the MTEF 
approach is not proven for any but the most advanced developing countries. For those 
countries that appear to have viable MTEFs, FAD should be involved, especially in ensuring   - 60 - 
 
that the process generates suitable overall envelopes to ensure macroeconomic stability. For 
the other countries, FAD should return to the more basic “nuts-and-bolts” work on budget 
preparation previously indicated—for example, to ensure an adequate economic and 
functional basis for the budget. 
 
  Box 8. Introducing MTEFs in Africa 
Both the Bank and the Fund have an active interest in implementing PEM reforms in developing 
countries. Generally, the two institutions tend to reinforce one another in providing TA in the PEM area. 
In Africa, collaboration has been hampered at times by the failure to coordinate the Fund’s short-term 
objectives for strengthening treasury and fiscal reporting systems with the Bank’s ambitious medium-
term reforms, particularly the introduction of MTEFs and development of IFMISs for improving PEM 
systems.  
Developing comprehensive MTEFs can be effective when circumstances and capacities permit. 
Otherwise, it can be a great consumer of time and resources and might distract attention from the 
immediate needs for improving the annual budget and budget execution processes. The MTEF, as a 
feasible means of improving budgeting, requires the following: 
•  Reliable macroeconomic projections, linked to fiscal targets in a stable economic environment. 
•  A satisfactory budget classification and accurate and timely accounting to produce a detailed 
pattern of expenditures over a past period of time. 
•  Technical capacity for separating the cost of policy changes from that of continuing policies 
and disciplined policy decision making. 
•  Budgetary discipline—large deviations between what is budgeted and what is spent tend to 
undermine the usefulness of multiyear budgeting. 
•  Strong institutional support and political discipline for fiscal management.  
Before introducing an MTEF, one should raise a question: Is the country ready for such an exercise in 
the sense of having adequate support for the above preconditions? When this support was not adequate 
in a number of African countries, the MTEF was introduced prematurely and is turning out to be merely 
a paper exercise. The MTEF concept was often cited as a tool for creating resources and to meet 
demands of all spending agencies. Not surprisingly, it was oversold at inception, and is now getting 
increasingly discredited when it is not able to deliver this worthy objective.  
In principal, the MTEF is a sound tool; a number of countries have prepared rolling multiyear 
expenditure programs since 1960. A multiyear perspective is especially important in developing 
countries the only question is when and how it is implemented. A reform process typically entails 
complex technical, procedural, institutional, and political adjustments. In Africa, one neglects these 
dimensions at one’s peril.  
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E.   Issues Not Substantially Addressed by FAD Technical Assistance 
Fiscal decentralization  
 
Decentralization of government operations is an increasing trend in all of Africa, not just in 
Anglophone African countries. Since the mid-1980s, most African countries started to 
transfer responsibilities and resources to subnational governments (see Table 4). Despite this 
trend, in terms of TA in the PEM area, FAD has made only a limited contribution thus far: 
Tanzania (mission), Uganda (mission and resident advisor for two years), and, quite recently, 
Ethiopia (two missions). The main attempt to address the specific PEM issues in Uganda, 
through TA provided by an advisor, yielded limited success.  
 
FAD did confront directly the scope of the problems created by decentralization when 
examining the means of tracking poverty-related spending through the HIPC AAP 
(Assessment and Action Plan) exercise. This examination identified a need for the central 
government to develop reporting and monitoring mechanisms for decentralized expenditures. 
However, the more general problem of what can be expected to be delivered from one 
advisor centrally located in the MOF in addressing this issue remains to be determined. 
Given the resource implications, obviously FAD needs to be very selective, say, focusing on 
a few issues—reporting, consolidation problems of budgets—and leaving the rest of this very 
large area to others. The following provides a brief review of the main issues. 
 
While some Anglophone African countries are only beginning to adopt legislation required 
for this move to decentralize government operations, others have progressed much further—
for example, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. This was largely precipitated by a return to 
democracy for some countries, but other factors have played a part. Donors promoted 
decentralization as a practical way of reaching the poor, and bringing government services to 
neglected areas of the country, whereas before they had been concentrated in urban areas, 
particularly in the capital city. At the same time, this is seen as an important step toward 
better governance away from administrative centralization operating within nondemocratic 
political regimes that in most cases were unaccountable and corrupt. 
 
Most of these countries have low levels of tax collection and large central government 
deficits, and, even with decentralization, the level of services supplied by lower-level 
governments can be expected to be very low. However, the World Bank has argued that with 
decentralization, information to target services will be superior and will make them more 
effective. Local monitoring will increase awareness of local needs and keep local officials on 
their toes. There are some doubters, however, who point to the deadweight cost of different 
layers of bureaucracy, which may be greater than the centralized bureaucracy that they 
replaced (or more likely they have been added to that central bureaucracy). Services 
produced at the local level may have a tendency to increase personnel costs, and there is 
some empirical evidence that, with decentralization, wages begin to absorb a larger share of 
total expenditures. 
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In some countries, a substantial share of subnational expenditures is covered by donors. If it 
is not well managed, this creates problems: expenditures tend to be concentrated in some 
“favored” regions, raising interregional equity issues; they tend not to be well coordinated 
with central and subnational recipient government budgets; and no allowance is made for the 
recurrent cost implications of investments. Part of the information problem is insufficient 
reporting of donors’ operations at the local level to the central government and often 
insufficient recording by subnational governments of these expenditures. One approach 
would be to include donors’ contributions in the country’s general-purpose, unconditional 
transfers system, so that the transfer to each region is adjusted by the amounts it receives 
from donors.  
 
Tax effort—as measured by the share of taxes in GDP—is generally low in Africa and 
concentrated heavily on foreign trade, with weak tax administration. Typically, this implies 
that the only tax sources for subnational governments are user charges and property taxes. In 
the absence of substantial new tax sources, huge vertical imbalances are likely. As a 
consequence, transfers will be an important part of the decentralization picture, at least in the 
near future. It will be important that their distribution formulas take into account the actual 
budget implications of devolution of functions and, at the same time, address the problem of 
reduction of disparity in poverty levels among areas. Specific purpose grants are difficult to 
employ because of the greater administrative capacity required.  
 
There is a general problem of establishing reporting systems to provide information to meet 
the various needs of the users on subnational government operations. In particular, in the 
context of HIPC debt relief, there will be the need to assess the extent to which government 
expenditures at all levels are pro-poor. The authorities will have to produce consolidated 
budget reports, which are one of the trigger points for reaching the HIPC completion points. 
 
It is recommended that FAD’s approach be selective in this area 
 
First, the focus should not be policy-oriented—for instance, finding the right mix of transfer 
and own revenue assignments or the most appropriate division of expenditure responsibilities 
should be left to others in FAD, or other TA providers. Rather, in PEM TA, the focus should 
be on how the PEM system can allow effective fiscal control to be exercised across general 
government. It should: 
 
•  Facilitate efficient and effective execution of expenditure responsibilities at the 
subnational level. 
•  Ensure that the central government’s responsibility in macroeconomic management is 
not compromised. 
Second, within this overall framework, the following approach should be considered: 
 
•  In the short term, improve coverage, timeliness, and consolidation of fiscal plans and 
reports to enable them to meet the HIPC-reporting commitments. In this context, an   - 66 - 
 
effective medium-term planning function that incorporates expenditures at the local 
level is important.  
•  Ensure that a consolidated budget in a standard format can be constructed. This 
should include adequate detail on revenues and expenditures, using GFS 
classification principles, and incorporating all external assistance. This requires a 
common chart of accounts and budget classification. 
•  Rationalize the financial management systems at the subnational levels: standardize 
accounting procedures, consolidate bank accounts to a subnational TSA, and 
incorporate extrabudgetary fiscal operations in the budgets. It will be essential to 
clearly account for the fiscal flows between tiers of government. 
•  Support regular in-year and end-year reporting from all subnational governments and 
EBFs to ensure overall expenditure and borrowing control. This is also important 
when central transfers are conditional. It is therefore necessary to ensure that 
adequate procedures are in place and that data are routinely provided to determine 
central transfers to subnational units. 
•  Ensure that a suitable legal framework and associated regulations are put in place to 
support the fiscal decentralization process. 
Internal audit 
 
Internal management control systems describe a range of management tools aimed at 
different broad objectives: first and foremost, to ensure compliance with laws and 
regulations; second, to ensure the reliability of financial data and reports; and, third, to 
facilitate the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations.
18 In this way, a sound 
internal control framework is designed to assure the public that these operations attain some 
basic fiduciary standards. As such, internal controls can be regarded as one of the 
foundations of good governance in a country, the first line of defense against improprieties, 
and as providing the public with “reasonable assurance” that if they do occur they will be 
made transparent and appropriately addressed. In such safeguards the government’s internal 
audit function has always been viewed as central. 
 
The Anglophone African countries inherited a budget management model that allows some 
flexibility in internal audit arrangements. The internal audit function is usually established in 
accordance with the powers and functions bestowed upon the treasury with regard to the 
responsibility for management, supervision, control, and direction of all matters related to the 
financial affairs of the government. The internal audit function can be viewed as support to 
                                                 
18 A more general description of the functions of internal controls in public expenditure management, and the 
specific tasks of internal audit, are contained in Diamond (1994).  
   - 67 - 
 
the MOF, assisting it in the monitoring of compliance by ministries and departments with 
various financial regulations, instructions, and accounting procedures. Alternatively, it can be 
viewed as assisting all levels of management in the effective discharge of their 
responsibilities through the submission of reports on their examinations and, when justified, 
appropriate action-oriented recommendations for corrective action. The demarcation between 
these views depends on the importance attached to the delegated responsibility given to AOs. 
 
Many Anglophone African countries have adopted a quite centralized approach to internal 
audit. Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda can be classified in this group, though in Malawi internal 
audit is very weak and is still in the process of being established. The MOF has an office of 
internal audit, which has a centrally managed cadre of auditors. These internal auditors are 
posted in the ministries but their personnel are based in the MOF and their work is managed 
there. The report of the internal auditor is given to the ministry AO and to the MOF. For 
example, in Kenya internal auditors report directly to the Office of the Internal Auditor 
General (IAG) in the MOF, with copies sent to their AO. Their work programs are 
determined by the IAG, and are funded from the IAG's budget. Unlike other centrally 
administered cadres seconded to the ministries, the ministry views the internal auditors as 
part of the MOF administration. In the Nigerian federal government, internal auditors are part 
of the same service as accountants under the Accountant General of the Federation, and are 
posted to the various line ministries. Recently, a central inspectorate was created in the 
Accountant General’s office to supervise this work. 
 
In other Anglophone African countries, internal auditors are envisaged as providing the AO 
with a service and are part of his management team. They report directly to the AO and only 
provide copies to the MOF. In this way, they are on par with the other MOF centralized 
cadres seconded to ministries. In South Africa and Ghana,
19 internal auditors are recruited 
and managed by the ministries, with no central MOF guidance or control on the internal 
auditors. There is always a certain tension in the Anglophone system arising from the need to 
strike a balance between the centralized responsibilities of the MOF and the internal 
management requirements of the AO. Over time, some of these countries, such as Kenya, 
have oscillated between the centralized inspectorate approach and the decentralized service 
approach. 
 
Whatever the model employed, there is ample evidence, as previously indicated in Section I, 
that this important function is in need of strengthening. FAD’s country experience strongly 
suggests that the management of the internal audit function is critical to its effectiveness but 
it is often weak and suffers from poor work practices, lack of planning and personnel 
management, and little support from the external audit. Despite the importance of internal 
audit as a fundamental element of PEM, it is clear that in many of the countries in this 
sample adequate resourcing for the function has often been neglected.  
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FAD’s advice in this area should be at the strategic end of TA in the design and development 
of the internal audit function. This will involve a number of dimensions: 
 
•  A clear and agreed upon definition of the internal auditors’ tasks. 
This is a way of clarifying the place of the internal audit function in the work of the budget 
institution, dispelling ambiguities and avoiding disputes when the internal auditor carries out 
these tasks. 
 
•  Establishment of line ministry audit committees. 
These should be formed from the top management of the institution and technical experts in 
the accounting and budget fields. The aim is to act as a steering committee for the work of 
internal audit, identifying problems as well as the corrective or preventive action. Not only 
does this act to strengthen the role of internal audit within the agency in enforcing financial 
discipline, but it also places some distance between the agency’s regular operations and 
internal audit evaluations.  
 
•  A central audit committee in the MOF. Similarly, to enforce this distance from 
day-to-day management and offer some external support, a central audit committee in 
the MOF should review the findings of the internal audit units and pursue remedial 
action. Another possible mechanism is to have outside professionals perform an 
independent external review of internal audit practices every two or three years, 
countering any tendency for agency managers to interfere with the internal audit 
function.  
•  Clear demarcation of responsibilities in relation to external audit. In some ways, 
this can be addressed by a clear and well-documented definition of the duties of 
internal auditors. At the same time, the relationship between the two functions should 
be recognized as symbiotic—it is important for the internal audit that there be a 
strong external audit, and vice versa. The external audit should use the work of the 
internal audit, and the latter should be guided by the findings of the external audit. 
•  Restructuring work practices. A strategic decision to be made in many Anglophone 
African countries is where best to deploy scarce audit skills. Ways to economize on 
the use of these scarce audit resources include the following: 
•  Prioritize to extend the scope of the internal audit. Improved work practices, say 
by moving away from extensive pre-audit of vouchers to a sampling approach, can 
often offer significant savings, as can improved management of the audit function 
through focusing on priority areas and the key weaknesses identified. One typical 
weakness that may benefit from internal audit review is the adequacy and 
effectiveness of internal controls in the existing systems. New systems should also be 
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•  Create special teams. In examining the internal audit function in Anglophone 
African countries, it is not unusual to discover that there are many functions that are 
either not being performed or the coverage of which is superficial because of 
inadequate staff, lack of specialized skills, and so on. Often the most productive use 
of limited audit staff is in special central teams earmarked for conducting audits in 
government agencies with the assistance of internal audit staff already stationed there. 
•  Formulate work plans more efficiently. Existing operational standards for internal 
audit require that the internal auditor adequately plan, control, and record his work. 
Such planning should be done not only for individual audit assignments but also for 
varying time periods such as a quarter, a year, and even longer periods.  
Debt management 
 
The HIPC initiative recently has reemphasized the importance of debt management in 
developing countries. Insufficient attention to debt management has been argued as being a 
significant factor contributing to the accumulation of unsustainable levels of debt in these 
countries. The assessments undertaken by the World Bank and the IMF reinforced the need 
to strengthen the debt management capacity in HIPCs. The assessments identified 
weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework for debt management, noting in 
particular the lack of close coordination among the budget, cash management and financial 
planning functions, and debt management operations.  
 
In African countries in general, there has been a tendency for MOFs to divorce debt 
management from aid management, with a different unit from the unit responsible for paying 
the subsequent debt service negotiating, contracting, and registering loans. Often, the 
management of the foreign debt has been separated institutionally from domestic debt, and, 
in many countries the central bank has played an important role in both. It is not uncommon 
for central banks to take an active role in debt servicing, calculating the amount due in debt 
service and debiting the government account. Unfortunately, the role of the central bank as a 
fiscal agent and as manager of monetary policy sometimes is not distinguished. The issuance 
of government paper to mop up excess liquidity is a monetary policy action, and in principle 
the cost of such action should be borne by the central bank and not by the government. In the 
distribution of responsibilities, there is often a need to distinguish between the strategic and 
operational aspects of debt management. 
 
In none of the countries in the sample did FAD’s advisor have debt management as a 
significant aspect of his TOR, even though it was a recognized problem in some of them. 
Even when cash management was included in the TOR, the coordination of cash with debt 
management was not highlighted. There is perhaps a case for redressing this imbalance in the 
future. 
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FAD’s approach in strengthening debt management usually should follow three main steps 
 
First, ensure that there is an effective organizational consolidation of debt and aid functions 
and a restructuring of tasks. Debt and aid management should be viewed as an integrated 
process, centered in one institution. There should be less emphasis on data processing and 
more on management and follow-up. These tasks should be fully integrated in government 
cash management, with emphasis on debt management, whose primary function is that of 
financing government operations at minimum cost and with the least disruption. This is 
accomplished by establishing a transparent and well-planned annual debt management 
strategy to prevent surprises in the course of budget implementation. The debt management 
strategy should be integrated with cash planning and hence would be better able to protect 
against disruption to public services. 
 
Second, create an integrated database to track all loans, from the time of agreement through 
the various stages of disbursement and the associated debt service payments. This should 
allow full reconciliation with bank statements and should be able to generate standard and 
diagnostic reports on all aspects of government loans and debt, including on-lending and 
guarantees. In Anglophone Africa, the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat have 
developed such software and have assisted countries in introducing it. 
 
Third, using such a database, the government’s debt management skills should be upgraded. 
This typically requires improved methods of debt contracting, risk analysis (including 
contingent liabilities), improved controls, and follow-up on on-lending agreements and 
government guarantees. In addition, there is also usually a need to develop effective 
procedures to handle commodity aid, direct payments to suppliers, and reimbursements so 
that they are fully accounted for and adequately managed.  
 
Legal framework 
 
The Anglophone African countries generally inherited a legal framework, often called the 
Accounts and Audit Act, which provided a simplified view of the obligations of various 
participants in the budget process, usually supplemented with a wide range of financial 
regulations. Over time, layers of financial regulations have often obscured and even 
overtaken the basic legal framework. As the operations of government have expanded, and 
the presidential system of government has become more pronounced, many of these 
countries have sought to change their basic legislation. South Africa was first, followed by 
Tanzania (Public Finance Management Act, 2000), Malawi (in the process of revising its 
law), Sierra Leone (recently submitted a draft organic budget law to the legislature), and 
The Gambia and Rwanda (seriously considering establishing a completely new legal 
framework). Uganda’s MTEF framework was introduced by a 2000 law. 
  
What should FAD’s approach be? 
 
This report largely supports FAD’s past approach in this area, to actively encourage and 
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African countries. When drafting organic budget laws, among other issues, special provisions 
need to be made to balance the fiscal powers between the legislative and the executive 
branches, and to ensure consistency with fiscal democracy and transparency principles. 
These include the timely submission of the budget to parliament, enhanced data presentation 
in the budget documents, and the rationalization of appropriation structures with a view to 
increasing legislations’ power in the original appropriations and virements during the year. 
The new legislation should prohibit the initiation of unbudgeted expenditures by the 
executive branch in the course of budget execution, except through supplementary 
appropriations. Moreover, new provisions should be made for management of different types 
of external grants and loans and full integration of recurrent and development budgets. Last 
but not least, provisions are needed to transform OAGs into modern treasury departments, 
fully integrated into the organizational structure of MOFs.  
 
The need to more clearly define fiscal relationships among the different tiers of government 
and to strengthen macro-fiscal discipline—in some cases in response to the aforementioned 
trend toward fiscal decentralization—suggests that FAD could also continue to help 
governments redraft their legal framework, which at times could entail the adoption of fiscal 
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IV.   PLANNING AND MANAGING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DELIVERY 
A.   Review of Technical Assistance Delivery 
A number of clear issues relating to the manner in which FAD TA was delivered emerged 
from this study. This section describes the main issues and how FAD is already seeking to 
address at least some of them. 
 
“Authorities’ commitment” has always been stressed as key—but is often difficult to 
gauge 
 
Strong commitment by the MOF is essential to initiate and sustain reforms, particularly in 
environments where legislative scrutiny and accountability are typically weak. Even when 
commitment is evident in the MOF, this can sometimes be undermined by poor support from 
the President’s Office. Sometimes it has been clear that the real decision makers may not 
necessarily be the immediate counterpart to FAD’s advisors or that the counterparts do no 
have the full confidence of the minister. In deciding whether to initiate TA, or to continue an 
assignment, FAD has perpetually had to make judgment calls on whether the lack of progress 
is evidence of the lack of commitment or the lack of capacity, or both. On the whole, the 
authorities have generally been given the benefit of the doubt and FAD tended toward 
agreeing that there was an acceptable level of commitment. Greater emphasis on the 
authorities’ track record in implementing recommendations, when considering TA requests, 
is a new trend that should be emphasized.  
 
However, this will remain a difficult judgment, particularly where the governance 
environment is unstable, where there is a high turnover of both senior policymakers and 
officials, and where intermittent crises may require urgent assistance and could provide a 
spur to the reform effort. Consequently, a more chaotic environment may require the use of 
more strongly enforced performance milestones, initially giving the authorities the benefit of 
the doubt to commence the TA, but making further support contingent on achieving a series 
of realistic reform milestones, which would demonstrate the authorities’ ongoing 
commitment. 
 
Ensuring that capacity preconditions exist 
 
The basis of FAD’s technical advice should be solidly grounded in what can be realistically 
implemented. This is a dimension that should also be more seriously considered in FAD’s 
TA planning. In the past, in responding to requests, FAD’s advice has often aimed to 
patch up deficient systems operated by weak administrations, which then proved 
unsustainable when FAD’s advisors left. Not only does this imply that increased attention 
should be paid to the development of human and institutional capacities in TA recipient 
countries, but it also suggests that FAD should spend more resources in diagnosing these 
weaknesses and in developing a strategy that is viable within such constraints. 
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Importance of quality and stability of counterparts 
 
The stability, rather than the quality, of counterparts has been a continuous problem in many 
African countries, where the career development of public officials is viewed as giving them 
a variety of assignments. For example, in Malawi counterparts turned over regularly (about 
every 18 months). Certainly, when a strong or knowledgeable budget director or permanent 
secretary is in place, progress appears more noticeable and vice versa.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, when wages are low and working conditions poor, so is morale. It is 
difficult to ignore MOF salary structures and relativities, which are often a key constraint on 
expanding human capacity and maintaining staff at the management level. In many countries, 
the incentive is for key officials to travel and supplement their low basic salaries with more 
generous travel allowances. Apart from remuneration, another problem is that staff training 
and human resources development tend to be minimal in these countries. A case can be made 
that in order for a country to receive a resident advisor, FAD should insist on a designated 
counterpart who will remain on the job at least for the duration of the advisor’s assignment, 
to ensure some minimal transfer of expertise.  
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic that is afflicting many African countries is putting a severe strain 
on human capacity as it tends to be most prevalent in the most economically active members 
of society. Of the sample countries covered in this paper, Zambia has the highest adult 
infection rate (21.5 percent at end-2001, according to UNAIDS), with Kenya and Malawi not 
far behind, at 15 percent each, and Rwanda and Tanzania following with 8.9 and 7.8 percent, 
respectively. Various studies have noted that this is becoming an increasingly important 
external constraint on efforts to build, or even maintain, administrative capacity. 
 
Institutional change has been difficult to achieve 
 
FAD’s TA advice has chosen to concentrate more on PEM functions than on the institutions 
that operationalize them. However, often it must be recognized that what can be achieved 
technically is constrained by existing institutional structures that need to be reformed. At the 
same time, it is recognized that in all countries, and not only in African ones, institutional 
change is difficult to bring about. For example, in Malawi, the MOF structure was identified 
as inappropriate early on in FAD’s TA, but despite lengthy recommendations in this area, 
little change was accomplished.  
 
For most countries, it has been accepted that advisors and missions will have to work within 
the institutional structure available, and, accordingly, FAD has tended to focus advice on 
more obvious inefficiencies. For example, in human-resource-poor countries, it is 
undesirable to have unnecessary duplication of functions, and, in order to fully exploit 
information technology, usually some reorganization is required both in work practices and 
within institutions. While pushing at the margin, central institutional issues that have 
weakened PEM systems have not been adequately addressed, including, as identified 
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integration of the OAG in the MOF, and the role of the MOF as financial manager when the 
President’s Office has wide financial decision-making powers.  
 
Adopting a realistic timetable 
 
In the past, FAD may have had unrealistic expectations of how fast reforms could be 
undertaken and produce results. At the same time, FAD has learned how quickly progress 
can be reversed. Certainly, in the African context, TA always seems to be a long-term task. 
This must be balanced by the fact that FAD’s resources are not infinite, and Fund programs 
are geared to results within a relatively short time frame. Accordingly, something of a 
conundrum is posed for FAD’s TA: whether to risk “placing the bar high enough to 
challenge” and getting no, or poor, results, or setting it at a lower level in the hope of at least 
making some useful short-term progress. The danger with the latter strategy is that it is 
possible to get trapped into a perpetual “Band-Aid” short-term approach. For some of the 
countries in the sample, there is a suspicion that this already is the case. Thus, there is a need 
to reassess the timetable for TA impact, while at the same time not neglecting to apply 
pressure on the authorities and FAD’s advisors to produce results. 
 
FAD’s collaboration with other TA providers is not always well coordinated with the 
deliverables 
 
In many countries of the sample, FAD has been only a minor TA provider compared with 
others. Often, the effectiveness of FAD’s advice has been reduced because it has been 
crowded out by the actions of other providers. For example, FAD’s insistence that for good 
cash management it is important to consolidate accounts and move to a TSA concept has 
often gone against donor insistence on separate project accounts for the donor’s fiduciary 
requirements. The focus of the World Bank on MTEF has often diverted the administration’s 
attention toward planning activities at the expense of more immediate budget execution 
problems, which were usually FAD’s primary concern. The focus on developing IFMISs has 
led to the premature abandonment of manual reporting systems, with a subsequent loss of 
information, at least in the short term, and has led us into a “Band-Aid” type of TA to 
improve data quality. Offering advice and technical support to a country’s authorities has 
often led FAD’s advisors to spend increasing amounts of their time in support of such 
medium-term initiatives and dissipated FAD’s central short-term advice. This approach has 
in many cases diverted the focus of FAD’s TA from other pressing priorities in order to 
respond to issues raised by other donors’ lending strategies, reinforcing the need for FAD’s 
recommendations to be discussed and accepted not merely by the authorities but by other TA 
providers and to coordinate FAD’s work more closely with theirs. Increasingly, missions and 
advisors have been encouraged to do this.  
 
FAD’s lack of follow-up 
 
Scarce resources have often resulted in a lack of follow-up to FAD’s TA advice. FAD has 
considered the idea of a simple follow-up letter to TA reports, sometime after the report is 
sent, inquiring as to the use the authorities have made of FAD’s recommendations. This has   - 75 - 
 
never been fully pursued, but there seems to be a very strong case for some follow-up to TA 
reports when there is no subsequent resident advisor. Similarly, provided conditions are 
right—namely, that authorities are genuinely willing, or the country is in an active Fund 
program—there also seems to be a case for FAD to provide regular follow-up TA when 
resident advisors are withdrawn. Certainly, in the case of a core group of African countries 
that over the years have had substantial TA from FAD and have been in and out of Fund 
programs, there is a clear case for more regular interaction. In this way, FAD can be made 
more aware of likely future TA demands and emerging problems before they reach a crisis 
point. This is an idea that has already been mentioned in the discussion of TA planning.  
 
FAD’s advice often did not fit into an overall TA plan 
 
In many ways the above issues revolve around FAD’s strategy for delivering TA in the PEM 
area, and evolving that strategy to make FAD’s TA more effective. Because in the past the 
approach has been to respond to immediate problems, and operate on more and more specific 
TOR for FAD’s advisor, there has been some difficulty in ensuring that the advisor’s work 
fitted into some overall reform plan, or TA strategy. This approach has also meant that FAD 
has relied on the authorities to determine the role, and set the work plans, of advisors. Often, 
the dangers of the resident advisors viewing their role as a hand-holding function became 
evident. For example, one can question whether this approach really builds capacity rather 
than dependence. In more than one case, after some time in a country, the advisor became 
virtually a top-level line official. In addition, this created the tendency of moving FAD’s TA 
more and more downstream. In some countries, it appears clear that a more viable long-term 
strategy could have been encouraged had the advisors made more of an effort to engage other 
TA providers who had more resources at their disposal than were available to FAD.  
 
It also raises a more general issue of whether FAD should be aiming to hand off 
responsibility to other TA providers sooner. On many occasions, FAD has exhibited an 
ambiguous position in this regard. On the one hand, FAD recognized the need for more 
resources to implement recommendations and actively encouraged others’ participation. On 
the other hand, FAD often expressed doubts as to whether other donors could be relied upon 
to take up the slack in specific TA areas, the speed at which they would respond, or even the 
type of advice they might give. Certainly, if the country requested program-related TA, 
FAD’s first reaction was to try to do this with internal resources. Underlying this approach 
appears to be the lack of a coordinated TA plan for the country, and a lack of ongoing 
collaboration with other donors, that would make any handoff to other providers much 
smoother. The development of country-specific TA plans, in collaboration with other 
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B.   Implications for FAD’s Technical Assistance Delivery 
A number of improvements to the planning and management of TA that would further 
increase the effectiveness of FAD’s individual inputs are listed below.  
 
A more comprehensive and strategic approach in planning TA 
 
As implied above, FAD’s TA has often lacked strategic vision, especially one that was 
aligned to a country’s own strategic priorities. In the past, FAD’s approach has been largely 
determined by demand, with FAD responding to requests from the authorities for advice to 
meet their PEM requirements. Many of these requests were made at the instigation of the 
area department, so that it was possible for FAD to influence the nature of the request. 
However, the degree of freedom for FAD to be proactive has not been great. The result has 
been that, in responding to demands, the particular need that was being satisfied did not 
necessarily fit into any coherent plan for the development of the country’s PEM system. 
Moreover, there is a suspicion that, in this way, FAD’s TA tended to provide a short-term 
response to a particular urgent need, rather than address longer-term, and perhaps more 
fundamental, problems. 
 
An essential element in improving this situation is to expend more resources in planning 
FAD’s TA strategy. In Fund area departments, there has already been some movement in this 
direction with FAD’s efforts to provide more realistic annual plans for regional TA 
allocation. However, to be effective, planning must be wider than this and, ideally, should be 
closely aligned with a country’s own broader reform strategy. The aim should be to promote 
a country-centered comprehensive approach to FAD’s TA delivery and, in collaboration with 
member countries, draw a country-specific PEM reform strategy supported by a concrete 
short- and medium-term reform plan. While many countries in Africa will inevitably 
continue to experience short-term shocks that will often require immediate TA assistance, the 
move toward a more strategic country-led approach should still be the focus of discussions 
with the country authorities to enlist their support and ownership. 
 
Therefore, when designing assistance strategies and reviewing requests for TA, FAD needs 
to give more consideration to the institutional and governance environment, as well as the 
technical deficiencies of the PEM system. One way to address these challenges and promote 
ownership is to integrate PEM issues into national PRSs and supporting programs such as the 
PRGF. One potential mechanism for aligning TA in PEM with the national PRSs in some 
countries is the HIPC Assessment and Action Plan (AAP) process, conducted by the World 
Bank and IMF in close collaboration with the government (see Box 9 for a full description). 
Although the AAP was designed for a specific purpose—tracking the effectiveness of 
commitments made in the context of HIPC debt relief—and is not necessarily applicable to 
all situations, it is highly relevant to the African context, regardless of whether a country is 
eligible for HIPC debt relief. The AAP framework addresses many of the weaknesses 
identified in the management of Fund TA in the past. The AAP framework is a 
comprehensive diagnostic approach that takes account of the priorities and capacity of a 
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donors.
 20 However, to ensure that the AAP (or a similar instrument) is adequately reflected 
in the national PRS or PRGF requires more coordination with the authorities and donors at 
the policy level.  
 
In 2002, FAD initiated a series of experimental internal Fiscal Strategy Briefs (FSBs) in an 
effort to strengthen its internal ability to prioritize its TA program. Since then, FSBs have 
been prepared for 41 countries, seven of which are for countries within this review. Despite 
the limited time frame, early experience suggests that the FSBs may prove to be a useful 
instrument, in terms of both contributing to TA prioritization and strengthening 
FAD’s dialogue with the area departments and external partners. The FSBs have 
three distinctive features. First, they prioritize across traditional TA areas, as well as within 
each of them. Second, they involve a more proactive view of what are considered the main 
reform needs and provide a basis for focused discussion with the area departments and 
others. Third, reform priorities and needs are more clearly linked to macroeconomic and 
institutional vulnerabilities, which cover such aspects as the commitment and capacity of the 
authorities. 
                                                 
20 This approach is not exclusive to the AAP process or HIPC countries. Similar approaches have been 
developed by bodies such as the multidonor Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) group, 
which is developing a standardized PEM assessment framework. See Allen, Schiavo-Campo, and Garrity 
(2004). 
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Box 9. HIPC Expenditure Tracking Assessment and Action Plans:  
Toward a Comprehensive Country-Centered TA Strategy 
 
Debt relief under the enhanced HIPC initiative places considerable emphasis on recipients demonstrating 
an increasing share of poverty-reducing expenditures in their budgets as well as accounting for the 
additional funds provided by the initiative. This is expected to be a key feature of each country’s poverty 
reduction strategy. In order to assess the capacity of individual countries to track and report on 
poverty-reducing spending, the Boards of the Bank and Fund introduced the HIPC expenditure tracking 
Assessment and Action Plan (AAP): a tool that aims to assess the capacity of the PEM system to deliver 
and report on the implementation of a country’s poverty reduction strategy. The assessment, which is 
done jointly by the World Bank, the IMF, and the government, leads directly to an action plan, supported 
by development partners where necessary, that is designed to address the priority weaknesses of the 
PEM system. AAPs have been agreed upon with each of the HIPC-eligible countries. The main features 
of the AAP are the following: 
 
•  An assessment framework—a questionnaire leads to 15 indicators representative of a 
well-functioning PEM system.* The indicators consider both performance (e.g., level of arrears, 
timeliness of reporting, etc.) and institutional dimensions (internal audit, medium-term expenditure 
framework). They cover all elements of the budget system—coverage, preparation, execution, and 
reporting—with a particular focus on the ability to plan, monitor, and track poverty-related 
spending. Countries are assessed against a minimum benchmark standard for each indicator. 
 
•  An action plan—an articulation of the short- and medium-term measures required to develop the 
PEM system so that it demonstrates the basic characteristics of a well-functioning PEM system. 
The action plan is regularly monitored, with reports included in IMF Article IV consultations. 
 
•  A technical assistance plan—a mapping of donor programs for the measures identified in the 
action plan and identification of areas where further support is needed.  
 
The first assessments were conducted in 2001 and reported to the Boards of the Bank and Fund in 2002. 
The results of a second round of AAPs will be reported to the Boards of the Bank and Fund in 
early 2005.  
 
*An additional indicator was added for the second round of assessments in 2003/04, relating specifically 
to the adequacy of the procurement system. 
 
 
 
A more coordinated approach  
 
By adopting a short-term and supply-on-demand approach, perhaps not enough attention was 
paid to ongoing TA being provided by others or broader-ranging local reform efforts. The 
fact is that, over recent years, there has been a substantial increase in TA provided by various 
donors in the PEM area, many of which have long-term reform programs or projects that 
have impacted FAD’s own TA provision. The need to coordinate better with other TA 
providers and other government initiatives has often not been fully recognized. The 
possibility of a duplication of effort, or of conflicting advice, was always a danger, and the 
obvious lack of coordination often sent conflicting signals to the authorities. Not only were 
TA priorities occasionally confused, but it was difficult to enforce country ownership and 
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To address this, and to establish countries’ ownership and responsibility for the 
implementation of TA advice, greater effort needs to be made to fit FAD’s TA into an overall 
government reform plan that allows better coordinated delivery of TA by the Fund and other 
TA providers. FAD’s past attempts to coordinate in the PEM area have shown that this is not 
easy or costless. Government institutions responsible for coordination are often extremely 
weak and as a relatively small provider, FAD often lacks the influence or resources to assist 
this coordination effort. Donors are also often responding not only to the priorities 
established in the country but also to those in their own headquarters.  
 
However, as a relatively small provider, FAD should recognize that the onus is on it to 
promote better coordination of its efforts with others. In this FAD is somewhat handicapped. 
Typically the large providers, often running large-scale programs and projects, have 
important and influential field offices that direct their TA. For an IMF division in 
Washington this presents substantial coordination problems and extra costs.  
 
One approach that has some potential in addressing the problem of local coordination is the 
regional approach of the African technical assistance centers (AFRITACs), which offer 
FAD the opportunity to liaise with governments and other TA donors on an ongoing basis in 
the field through regional advisors. It should also help to promote sharing technical best 
practices and other lessons of PEM reform within the region. The first AFRITAC was set up 
in Tanzania in November 2002, followed the next year by an AFRITAC in West Africa. The 
role of the AFRITACs will soon be subject to external evaluation that will allow firmer 
conclusions on whether this approach can satisfy these coordination needs.  
 
Enhanced headquarters management of TA 
 
Adopting a more strategic approach to TA delivery and better coordinating with other 
providers, in turn, has important implications for the role of FAD headquarters in 
TA delivery. Often, in the past, FAD headquarters’ support has been viewed as primarily 
technical, focused on backstopping expert advice in the field. The approach envisaged here 
would require much more effort at headquarters in the planning of TA and in the 
coordination efforts with other donors. Substantially more resources will need to be invested 
in oversight and support from headquarters to ensure that implementation of TA advice is 
timely, effective, and compatible with that of other providers. 
 
At the same time it will require greater investment in managing TA, especially the human 
resource element. It has been noted that the TA provided to this group of countries has been 
primarily through the assignment of resident advisors. The preponderance of advisors 
indicates that one of the important aspects of FAD’s TA has been the work at headquarters in 
recruiting, backstopping, and managing these advisors to maintain the quality of TA advice. 
Throughout the period, FAD has tightened this quality assurance in a number of ways.    - 80 - 
 
The first assurance of quality has always been to attempt to recruit only the best advisors. 
FAD has made a substantial effort to ensure that each potential advisor is enlisted onto the 
panel of experts only after being interviewed by senior FAD staff in the same discipline, and 
has been offered an advisor’s position only after having been tried out on mission. Second, 
there has been an increasing tightening of the advisor’s TOR. The inclusion of the country 
authorities and area departments has been encouraged in drafting the TOR, as has the trend to 
clarify the areas of focus, and expected outputs, of the assignment. This has allowed the TOR 
to be more easily translated into detailed work plans against which TA progress can be 
monitored. Third, the importance of backstopping has been increasingly stressed, and 
alternates have been assigned primary backstoppers to act on behalf of advisors who are 
traveling. The discipline of monthly reporting by the advisors was enforced, as was the 
attempt to cut down on the lag in responding to their reports.  
 
In addition, the practice of inspecting advisors was enhanced, so that the standard time was 
shortened from annually to six months. Moreover, to give a fresh and less-biased view of the 
work, the inspection was carried out by staff other than the backstopper. Recently the role of 
advisors and their backstoppers and a clear statement of their respective responsibilities was 
incorporated into FAD’s TA manual. Fourth, an annual review of advisor performance was 
introduced, to allow the backstoppers to undertake a systematic assessment of each advisor’s 
performance in relation to his or her output objectives. Typically, this involved some ex post 
evaluation of the reasons for success and failure, which often gave rise to some corrective 
measures. Cases where there was clear evidence of under-performance led to early 
termination of the advisor’s contract. 
 
Despite this system of internal controls, not all advisors performed as expected. In reviewing 
the individual country experiences, performance was mixed. Perhaps this is not surprising. In 
the African environment the advisor’s job is not an easy one. With a joint subordination to 
the authorities and the IMF, the advisor is officially employed by the IMF but is the 
authorities’ advisor and, as such, is expected to provide them with the best advice. Implicitly 
it is assumed that there will be no conflict between this duty and the obligation of reporting 
to the IMF, but in reality there are many gray areas where advisors risk their longer-term 
relationship with the authorities by being seen as too much of an agent for implementing 
Fund program conditionality or as inflexible in not supporting initiatives that the IMF 
opposed.  
 
In countries with weak administrative capacity it is undoubtedly difficult to maintain an 
advisory role at all times—that is, in assisting counterparts in carrying out their line duties 
and not replacing them. In the absence of suitable counterparts, some advisors definitely 
drifted toward the latter approach and had to be corrected by their backstoppers. In this 
environment, the past experience of the advisors—especially in the context of developing 
countries—appeared critical. Often, advisors with much stronger qualifications on paper but 
without this type of experience proved disappointing. Similarly, those less technically 
qualified but with good “people skills” did much better than expected. It is difficult to 
separate such intangible factors in judging the quality of the advisor’s TA advice. 
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However, there are obvious areas for improvement. FAD should spend more time and 
resources in the recruitment process. This has in the past been considered a task to be carried 
out back-to-back with other work, as a sideline rather than important in its own right. 
Moreover, recruitment has become increasingly important as the available pool of advisor 
talent has been tapped into by other TA providers, including the private consulting firms that 
have expanded their work in the PEM area. Bilateral TA has also increased in this area, so 
OECD nationals are increasingly recruited by their own governments for TA. FAD must 
work harder and invest more in maintaining its roster of fiscal experts.  
 
Second, there is still room for tightening the backstopping function, following trends that are 
already visible—for example, increasing the focus of TORs, formulating more detailed 
advisor work plans, and updating according to discussions with the authorities. There is room 
for increased contact with the advisor by telephone and electronic means.
21 Other options 
include in-field workshops with several resident advisors to discuss common problems and 
their solutions, and perhaps also with their counterparts to ensure better feedback from the 
authorities. Rather than inspection missions, more frequent backup missions could monitor 
and evaluate progress and set new work plans. This would reinforce the status of the advisor 
in the eyes of the authorities and, by increasing the authorities’ dialogue with FAD, enhance 
ownership. There is also room for strengthening the contacts between the backstopper and an 
FAD economist and the area department team. Last, but not least, more frequent in-depth 
reviews of FAD’s TA, like this study, followed by specific TA country strategies, seem 
called for to improve the quality of TA advice.  
                                                 
21 For example, FAD has experimented recently with an “e-room” approach to allow PEM advisors in the field 
access to headquarters information and to share information with other advisors.    - 82 - 
 
V.   SUMMARY OF A REFORMULATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STRATEGY 
To improve FAD’s TA delivery in a situation of limited resources, it is necessary to be more 
selective, while at the same time improving the management of TA. To accomplish this, 
FAD needs to prioritize better and learn from past experience.  
 
For many of the Anglophone African countries, which have been long-term clients of the 
Fund, there is a clear case for more regular interaction than in the past—to diagnose 
emerging problems before they reach crisis proportions. To be effective, this regular 
interaction should be coordinated with other TA providers and be nested in an overall 
TA country strategy in which the authorities have some ownership. Much of this agenda 
neatly dovetails with the regional approach of the AFRITACs currently being implemented, 
the initial performance of which will be reviewed in the near future. FAD is also taking a 
number of steps to improve its management processes, including experimenting with internal 
Fiscal Strategy Briefs to help coordinate, prioritize, and manage its TA. 
 
This report review of the difficulties involved in introducing different PEM reforms suggests 
that FAD’s future TA strategy should be modified to be more strategic in the type and mode 
of TA delivered, to better coordinate work with the medium-term capacity-building efforts of 
other providers, and to selectively get involved in new areas.  
 
As indicated at the outset of this study, FAD’s TA in the PEM area has tended to be geared to 
the short-term needs of area department programs. In many ways, this has created pressure 
for a more downstream form of TA delivery: providing experts to design and implement 
fiscal reporting systems; improving data quality; and strengthening expenditure control 
mechanisms, most particularly through introducing CCSs. This report sees future TA being 
strengthened by the following: 
 
•  Placing PEM TA into a more strategic framework. The internal prioritization and 
management of the TA provided should be more suited to country circumstances, 
institutions, governance factors, and capacity. FAD also needs to consider the 
assistance strategies of other donors and providers. Where possible FAD should fit its 
TA into a nationally owned overall PEM TA plan, based on a country-specific 
comprehensive strategy for TA. This should be agreed upon with authorities and 
other donors and be closely coordinated with IMF country teams. The HIPC AAP 
process is one initiative, among others, that could help to determine a country’s 
priorities in PEM, coordinate government and other providers, and determine the best 
mode of delivery. TA would then be provided only where it is consistent with this 
framework or is required following a shock to the PEM system. 
•  Seeking national commitment. For those countries where it is judged that the ongoing 
commitment to improve PEM is problematic and capacity is low, preconditions must 
be agreed upon for PEM reform performance milestones, to justify new and ongoing 
TA as well as to identify good or stable counterparts. FAD should consider 
withdrawing its assistance when countries fail to put into place the mutually agreed   - 83 - 
 
upon reform steps in a satisfactory manner. This approach builds on current practices, 
under which resident experts are normally appointed for six-month renewable terms, 
and inspection missions are fielded before long-term assignments are extended. 
•  Paying more attention to follow-up and implementation. There could be a 
strengthening in the oversight, support, and follow-up to our recommendations. FAD 
remains committed to the backstopping role—ensuring that advice is subject to 
quality assurance by leading experts. When countries lose interest in implementing 
good advice, FAD should review its role. Similarly, if FAD fails to address the 
problems of concern to authorities, then the authorities should advise FAD 
accordingly. Where possible this would include strengthened oversight, support, and 
follow-up to FAD’s recommendations. 
•  Ensuring that TORs are more focused. FAD is putting greater emphasis on ensuring 
(i) that TORs are well-researched and informed; (ii) that they concentrate on priority 
issues, with clearly defined outcomes; and (iii) that they are more directly negotiated 
with the authorities and with other donors where appropriate. This is reinforced with 
more ongoing involvement in oversight and backstopping from headquarters. The 
result is to place a greater emphasis on mission preparation, with a deliberate focus on 
the resources and information required to deliver high-quality advice.  
•  Applying realistic timetables for PEM reforms. This will often imply adopting 
different timetables for TA delivery for different countries or topics. It also 
recognizes the potential requirement for more regular, ongoing involvement for 
longer time periods than was previously considered in some countries. 
•  Agreeing on division of labor with other providers. This review has revealed the 
importance of better coordinating FAD’s largely short-term TA interventions with the 
longer-term TA projects and programs of governments and other TA providers. It 
does not suggest that FAD has a comparative advantage in replacing these other 
providers or national initiatives, but it does suggest both the areas where FAD might 
focus its TA and the best mode of TA delivery. These decisions should be made in 
conjunction with other providers and the country authorities. Where it can, FAD 
should support the work of experts engaged by other providers, for instance through 
information sharing. 
 
FAD should continue its efforts at strengthening core PEM operations, maintaining a 
balance between downstream TA (data quality and more direct links with IMF program 
needs) and upstream TA (focused on diagnostic and strategic reform overviews). In budget 
preparation, FAD should continue its current work in introducing or refining budget 
classification in line with international standards and in strengthening budget processes, the 
budget timetable, and MOF analytical capacity. In budget execution, there should be a 
continued focus on fiscal reporting, mainly from a short-term perspective and aimed at 
tackling general data quality issues that are of concern for Fund program work. However, 
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•  Coverage in reporting is adequate for Fund programs. 
•  Tracking of poverty-reducing expenditures, as specified in PRSPs, is effective, as a 
subset of fiscal reporting. 
•  Mechanisms are in place to track arrears (stock and flow). 
•  Basic benchmarks for data quality are met: reports are timely; coverage of 
government bank accounts matches that of the monetary survey; below-the-line 
accounts are closed; changes in debt stock are reconciled with financing flow data; 
and below- and above-the-line data are reconciled. 
FAD should continue its emphasis on establishing commitment controls but should be 
more selective in the introduction of such systems, which should be seen as involving a 
package of supporting elements. The feasibility of introducing a CCS should be gauged by: 
 
•  Undertaking an assessment of the adequate realism of budget estimates. 
•  Ensuring a minimum cash-planning capacity underlying the cash-release system. 
•  Assessing the feasibility of putting in place arrears-monitoring mechanisms. 
If these elements cannot be met, FAD’s TA should be redirected toward removing these 
impediments to establishing a comprehensive CCS. 
 
The case studies suggest three priority areas for enhanced coordination with other medium-
term capacity-building efforts: 
 
(1) The introduction of MTEFs 
FAD’s support needs to be selective among countries. For those countries where the MTEF 
has strained administrative and technical capacity, FAD should offer only “nuts-and-bolts” 
TA, which, in any case, should be the basis of a sound MTEF—namely: 
 
•  Develop macroeconomic policy and analysis. 
•  Improve budget classification. 
•  Assist in integration of recurrent and development budgets. 
For those countries where MTEFs appear more viable, FAD’s involvement should focus on 
ensuring the realism of the resulting macroeconomic envelope.   - 85 - 
 
(2) Support of IFMISs 
FAD’s support should be limited only to the first stages of what are generally very lengthy 
projects in the African context. It should be based on a judgment that preconditions for 
success exist and should have a well-defined exit point. The focus should be on the design 
and test stage (which could include pilot implementation) to ensure sound functionality of the 
system. Given the importance of these core systems to PEM, if the judgment on the 
preconditions is negative, an effort should still be made at some level to engage the country 
authorities and sponsor-donor(s) to address the main impediments and ensure that existing 
systems are not compromised (or perhaps even that they be strengthened) during the 
development work. 
 
(3) Modernizing the legal framework 
FAD’s advice should be directed to ensure that the underlying budget process adopted in any 
revised legislation is realistic and not overly ambitious for the country’s administrative 
capacity. This also entails pressing for required institutional changes to make the legislation 
effective. 
 
Selectively getting involved in new areas 
With limited resources, there is no large margin for FAD to undertake more extensive TA. 
Nonetheless this study has highlighted additional areas of PEM that have grown in 
importance over the last decade. FAD could consider addressing these priorities only if they 
are considered to be urgent and of strategic importance to achieving broader macroeconomic 
goals, such as those set out in the PRSP; if firm country ownership can be demonstrated; or if 
TA gaps develop because there are no other donors. Under these conditions, three areas have 
been identified as possible candidates for more extensive TA: 
 
(1) Decentralization issues, with a focus on Fund program needs: 
•  Ensure that the country’s intergovernmental relations are designed to allow efficient 
execution of all expenditure responsibilities, and macroeconomic management is not 
compromised. 
•  Allow countries to meet HIPC-reporting commitments. 
•  Ensure that a consolidated budget in a standard format can be constructed. 
•  Rationalize and standardize financial management functions at the subnational level. 
•  Ensure regular in- and end-year reporting from all subnational governments. 
•  Ensure that adequate data reporting and procedures are in place to determine and 
execute central transfers to subnational levels.   - 86 - 
 
Ultimately, to meet these needs, it is recognized that good budget formulation and execution 
processes need to be developed at the subnational level. However, given FAD’s resources, it 
can only expect to have a minimal direct input at this level.  
 
(2) Internal audit: 
•  Clarify and strengthen internal audit tasks. 
•  Introduce supporting institutional arrangements. 
•  Restructure work practices to increase audit effectiveness. 
(3) Debt management, especially for HIPC countries: 
•  Assure an effective organizational consolidation of debt and aid functions, and 
corresponding restructuring of tasks. 
•  Create an integrated database to track all loans, including on-lending, from the time 
of agreement through debt service payments. 
•  Use such a database to promote debt management skills (debt contracting; risk 
analysis; improved controls, especially on on-lending; guarantees; commodity aid; 
and reimbursements). 
Concluding observation 
Overall, the approaches outlined imply a more regular interaction with client countries than 
has been the case in the past, with the aim of diagnosing emerging problems and providing 
more focused interventions before problems reach crisis proportions. To be effective, this 
regular interaction should be coordinated with other providers and nested in an overall 
country TA strategy, in which the country authorities display ownership. 
 
Some of the adaptations just described will add to costs. Given the overall resource 
constraints, they may therefore need to be accompanied by greater selectivity in responding 
to new requests—that is, providing assistance to a smaller number of countries in any given 
period but with a larger commitment to each country served.  
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